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Humans and animals need to make decisions under various degrees of uncertainty. These 
decisions are strongly influenced by an individual's risk attitude.  Substantial studies have 
demonstrated that one’s risk attitude can vary substantially across different behavioral contexts. 
For instance, humans and animals show different risk attitudes when facing risky gains versus 
risky losses. The abundance of resources in the environment and the current wealth of subjects 
also modulate an individual's risk attitude. Prospect theory, the most successful and wide-ranging 
descriptive model of decision-making under risk, explains these behavioral effects using the 
concepts of a reference point and loss aversion.  
However, at present, prospect theory cannot be clearly interpreted in terms of neuronal 
mechanisms. None of the known structures or processes involved in decision-making in the 
primate brain has been convincingly related to the two key concepts: reference point-dependence 
and loss aversion.  
Based on human imaging and lesion studies, we hypothesized that the anterior insular 
cortex (AIC)  may be the candidate that represent the current state of the subject (the reference 
point) as well as reference-dependent value signals that differ in loss or gain context 
(asymmetrical value functions in loss and gain) suggested by prospect theory.  
Using a new token gambling task, we found that macaques, like humans, change their 
risk attitude across wealth levels and gain/loss contexts. In addition, monkeys’ risk behaviors 
were well explained with a wealth-dependent prospect theory model. Furthermore, neurons in the 
primate AIC monitor contextual factor that influence monkey’s risk attitudes. Many AIC neurons 
encoding the wealth level of the monkey as well as the expected value of options in a gain/loss-
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specific manner. A subset of AIC neurons can further predict inter-trial fluctuations of the 
monkey’s risk attitude. These findings suggest a role of the primate AIC in representing 
economic gain and loss relative to a reference point and in influencing the likelihood of 
accepting a risk during uncertain decisions. We anticipate our finding to be a starting point for 
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1.1 Background and significance   
      Humans and animals need to make decisions under various degrees of uncertainty. These 
decisions are strongly influenced by an individual’s risk attitude. Risk attitude is often seen as a 
fundamental, stable personality trait (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014b). However, recent studies have 
demonstrated that one’s risk attitude can vary substantially across different behavioral 
contexts(Pedroni et al., 2017; E. U. Weber et al., 2002). For instance, humans show different risk 
attitudes when facing risky gains versus risky losses(Canessa et al., 2013). The abundance of 
resources in the environment and the current wealth of subjects also modulate an individual’s 
risk attitude(Juechems et al., 2017; Stephens, 2008; Vermeer et al., 2014; Yamada et al., 2013). 
These findings suggest that risk attitude is not a stable personality trait, but rather emerges during 
the process of decision-making in a context-dependent manner(Farashahi et al., 2018; Payne et 
al., 1992; Slovic, 1995). 
      Prospect theory(Tversky & Kahneman, 1979), the most successful and wide-ranging 
descriptive model of decision-making under risk, explains these and other behavioral effects 
using the concepts of a reference point and loss aversion. Prospect theory first assumes that 
possible future outcomes (‘prospects’) are evaluated relative to a reference point (reflecting 
current wealth and resources), either as gains or as losses. Second, losses are assumed to weigh 
stronger than gains, which leads to an aversion to loss.  
      Evidence from Capuchin monkey trading behavior indicates these primates displayed several 
hallmark biases like humans, including reference dependence and loss aversion (Chen et al., 
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2006). It may suggest that there is an evolutionarily ancient decision-making system in the 
primate brain dealing with these risk preference characteristics shared by humans and animals. 
However, at present prospect theory cannot be clearly interpreted in terms of neuronal 
mechanisms. None of the known structures or processes involved in decision-making in the 
primate brain has been convincingly related to the two key concepts of reference point-
dependence and loss aversion.  
      Human imaging experiments and lesion studies have identified a network of brain areas that 
are active during decision-making under risk(Breiter et al., 2001; Hsu et al., 2005, 2009; Huettel 
et al., 2006; Jung et al., 2018; Krain et al., 2006; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Rao et al., 2008). Of 
particular interest is the anterior insular cortex (AIC), a large heterogeneous cortex in the depth 
of the Sylvian fissure. Human fMRI studies have suggested a crucial role of AIC in promoting 
risk-averse behavior(Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), representing the current internal state(Craig & 
Craig, 2009), and influencing the level of loss aversion(Canessa et al., 2013). Patients with 
lesions in the insular cortex are less risk-averse(Clark et al., 2008; Shiv et al., 2005). These 
findings suggest a wider role of AIC in representing both the current state of the self (reference 
point) and aversive signals that strengthen the tendency for risk-averse choices (loss aversion). 
However, due to the limited spatial and temporal resolution of the BOLD signal, human imaging 
studies are limited in terms of the interpretation of the underlying neuronal activities. Thus, 
neuronal mechanisms underlying these fundamental features of risk-preference are not well 
understood.  
      To address this issue, we recorded neural activity in the AIC of monkeys during a token-
based gambling task developed to test their risk attitude in the gain and loss domain and as a 
function of starting token number (i.e., wealth level or reference point). We hypothesized that 
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AIC neurons represent behaviorally relevant contextual information that influences the 
probability of choosing a risky reward option. We first examined behavioral data to test if and 
how monkeys changed risk attitudes in varying behavioral contexts (gain or loss outcomes; 
different starting token assets). Next, we tested a series of models to predict monkey’s choice 
based on decision-related variables. Then we identified AIC neurons representing factors that 
influence risk attitudes, such as start token number, gain or loss outcome, the value of the option, 
and uncertainty. Finally, we determined whether the AIC neurons encoding these factors also 
predict the monkey’s choice or risk attitude.     
      The current research is one of only a few studies (<5) to examine animal’s risk attitude in the 
“loss” domain. With the development of the token-based gambling task, it helped us to find that 
monkeys’ risk attitudes were not always constant across context but adjusted by various 
contextual factors. In addition, comparing to substantial studies focus on animals’ responses to 
aversive stimuli like intense light/sound, air-puff, foot-shock, bitter taste, or omission of reward 
delivery, this task allowed us to examined animal’s risk attitude when facing an “economic loss”, 
which was investigated by only a few studies. Moreover, through the token-based gambling task 
developed here, we can explore important effects in economic theory, such as status quo bias, 
loss aversion, the endowment effect (subjects are more likely to keep an object they own than 
acquire the same object if they do not own it), and the framing effect (subject tends to avoid risk 
when a positive frame is presented but seek risk when a negative frame is presented). By 
combining the behavioral paradigm with electrophysiological recording, this research has the 
power to discover, for the first time, the specific coding of value signal in the gain and loss 
domain and at different wealth levels in the primate brain (specifically in the anterior insular 
cortex in this dissertation). The anterior insular cortex is clearly highly important for decision-
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making under risk. Nevertheless, with respect to single-unit studies of cognitive functions, it is 
complete terra incognita. The insular cortex is clearly an understudied brain region that likely 
participates in many different functions. Specifying its functional role in one context in detail 
will provide a great impetus for the further study of this important brain region.   
1.2 Decision making under risk 
We make a lot of decisions every day: some simple, some complicated. Sometimes we can 
be quite certain that our actions will result in a given outcome, while at other times we can only 
know that our choice will result in a given outcome with a specific probability. When, in a given 
decision scenario, the outcomes of potential choices are uncertain, it is called a decision under 
risk. When making decisions under risk, our preference toward risk will strongly influence our 
choices. Imagine that you have won a prize with $1000 in an event, and now the host offers you 
a choice to directly get the $1000 or toss a coin to double the prize or return it to zero. Your 
choice between the safe option and the risky option will be highly affected by your risk attitude. 
A risk-averse person will prefer to get $1000 for sure because it is safer, while a person who is 
risk-prone will be more likely to toss the coin because it provides a chance to win more bonus 
(though loss the prize as well). 
Since the outcomes of most of our choices are uncertain, decisions under risk are central to 
our daily lives. Decision-making under risk has been extensively studied in several scientific 
fields, such as economics, finance, psychology, and neuroscience. However, across these 
disciplines, different conceptual frameworks have been used for describing risk (Glimcher, 
2008). This has led to ambiguity and confusion. Thus, it is important to understand the meaning 
of terms such as risk, risk attitude, value, and utility in distinct perspectives.   
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1.3 Risk attitude  
1.3.1 Classical economic theory -- Expected value theory   
Consider a gambler faced with two options: (1) throwing a single six-sided die, which wins 
$1500 if an odd number appears and wins $500 if an even number appears, or (2) getting $1000 
certainly without throwing a die (see Table1). The classical economic theory began with the 
work of Pascal (1670/1966), who proposed that people deal with this problem by maximizing 
expected value. That is, people should calculate the expected value (EV) of each option and 
choose the one with the highest EV. The EV of each option is defined as the magnitude of each 
possible outcome multiplied by its probability summed over all possible outcomes:  
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑥1𝑝1 + 𝑥2𝑝2 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑛𝑝𝑛    = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 ,  
where xi is the (monetary) outcome of the state i and pi is the probability of state i.  
      Table 1.1 shows how the expected value can be computed in the above example. Doing this 
shows that the EV of option 1 and option 2 is both $1000. Thus, if choices are selected by 
maximizing EV, a decision-maker should have no preference between these two options since 
the EV of these two options are identical. This example suggests two important things about 
Pascal’s Expected Value theory. First, the decision-maker is expected to care only about the EV 
of options but to be not sensitive to the variance of outcomes (i.e., risk). Thus, the decision-
maker is assumed to be risk-neutral. Second, the subjective value of each option is a direct linear 
function of its objective value (Figure 1.1A). This function is indifferent to a global scaling 
operation. Thus, the relative advantage of one option over another is not changed, if a certain 
amount is added or subtracted evenly from all options. Therefore, no matter what the current 
wealth level of a subject is (i.e., the momentary reference point), the subject should make the 
same consistent decisions.  
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1.3.2 Classical economic theory -- Expected utility theory   
      The theory of expected value is mathematically influential and allows people to calculate 
their long-run average payoffs in many decision-making contexts. However, it is severely limited 
as a descriptive theory of human decisions under risk, because of its inability to account for risk-
seeking or risk-averse behavior. For instance, it cannot explain why people would prefer getting 
$49 for sure over getting $100 by chance or why people would purchase insurance. In all of these 
scenarios, people prefer the safe over the risky option even so the EV of the safe option is lower 
than the EV of the risky option. Daniel Bernoulli (1738) dealt with this problem by replacing 
objective (e.g., monetary) values with subjective values, that is, the ‘utility’ or pleasantness one 
(expect to) experience following that particular decision (Stearns, 2000). Instead of maximizing 
the expected value (EV) of options, Bernoulli’s model suggests people tend to choose the option 
with the highest expected utility (EU): 




where u(xi) represents the utility of outcome of state i (xi) and pi is the probability of state i. In 
this model, the main difference from Pascal’s expected value formulation is that there is a 
nonlinear mapping between the monetary outcomes (xi) and their corresponding internal utility 
(u(xi)).  
𝑢(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖𝛼, 
where u(xi) is an exponential function of monetary outcomes (xi) with a free parameter α. 
      In Bernoulli’s original formulation, he used a logarithmic transformation. In modern versions, 
it is common to use a power law, as indicated above. This mathematical formulation is identical 
to Stevens’s Power Law (Stevens, 2017) that specifies the psychophysical function that 
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transforms the strength of a sensory stimulus into a subjective human level of perception. 
Likewise, the utility function transforms the objective state of the world (e.g., the monetary 
amount that is lost or gained) into an internal subjective value. The parameter α controls the 
curvature of the utility function and therefore the subjective mapping of the objective outcome. 
Moreover, the expected utility model of decision under risk links the curvature of the utility 
function naturally to an individual’s risk-attitude (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). If α is 
one, it results in a straight line as described in the expected value model (Figure 1.1A). 
(Therefore, Pascal’s expected value model is contained in expected utility theory as a special 
case.) If α is less than one, the utility function is a concave curve so that the internal utility-scale 
is compressed (Figure 1.1B). That means that subjective value becomes less sensitive to changes 
in objective magnitude as it increases. This leads to less sensitivity to large outcome magnitudes 
and thus to risk-averse behavior. On the other hand, if α is larger than one, the utility function is 
a convex curve, indicating that subjective value becomes more sensitive to changes in objective 
magnitude as it goes up (Figure 1.1C). This leads to risk-seeking behavior. 
      To illustrate the relationship between risk attitude and utility function curvature, we first 
consider a person with a concave utility function (e.g., α = 0.92; Figure 1.1B). The utility 
difference between an outcome of $50 and of $100 can be calculated as: u ($100) – u ($50) = 
$1000.92 - $500.92 = $32.62. To examine the effect of outcome magnitude on utility we study next 
another option set [$150, $200] with an expected value difference that is identical to the first set 
[$50, $100], but with an overall increased magnitude of the outcomes. The utility difference 
between these two options is: u ($200) – u ($150) = $2000.92 - $1500.92 = $30.44. This 
demonstrates that for a person with a concave utility function the subjective wealth increment 
between two options decreases (from $32.62 to $30.44), as the overall wealth level across both 
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options increases (from 50 to 100). When such a subject faces a choice between: (1) getting $100 
for certain or (2) getting either $200 or $0 with equal probability 0.5, the EU of the sure option 
will be $1000.92 * 1 = 69.18 and the EU of the risky option will be $2000.92 * 0.5 + $0 * 0.5 = 
65.45 (Table 1.2). Thus, the subject with a concave utility function will be more likely to choose 
the sure option and behave in a risk-aversive manner.  
       Next, we consider a subject with a convex utility function (e.g., α = 1.08; Figure 1.1C). The 
utility differences (ΔEUs) of the two option sets [$50, $100] and [$150, $200] for this subject 
are:  $1001.08 - $501.08 = $76.17 and $2001.08 - $1501.08 = $81.61, respectively. Thus, for this 
subject, the subjective wealth increment increases, as the overall wealth level increases. If the 
subject faces the same choice between getting $100 for certain or getting $200 with a winning 
probability of 0.5, the EU of the sure option will be $1001.08 * 1 = $144.54 and the EU of the 
risky option will be $2001.08 * 0.5 = $152.79 (Table 1.3). Thus, the subject with a convex utility 
function will prefer the risky option over the sure option behave in a risk-seeking manner. 
      The expected utility (EU) theory extended the expected value (EV) theory in at least two 
aspects. First, in contrast to EV theory, which assumes people make decisions in a risk-neutral 
manner, EU theory allows people to exhibit risk-seeking or risk-aversive behavior. Specifically, 
the EU model assigns a free parameter α to describe the risk attitude through a nonlinear utility 
function. This modification makes the EU theory a better predictor of human choice behavior.  
Second, this nonlinear utility function also leads to an effect of wealth level on risk attitude. 
People are predicted to have different levels of risk preference with changing starting wealth 
points since the marginal utilities are modulated by the curvature of the utility function. For two 
subjects with the same concave utility function, an identical gamble offer will be more attractive 
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to the subject that owns nothing than to a subject that is a millionaire, because the marginal 
increase in utility for the poor subject is higher than for the rich subject.  
 
Figure 1.1. Expected value and expected utility functions. (A) Value function in expected 
value formulation, demonstrating a linear relationship between objective value and subjective 
value. Plotted as the black dotted (diagonal) line in panels (B) and (C). (B) Utility function with 
α = 0.92 in expected utility formulation, demonstrating a concave relationship between objective 
value and subjective value. (C) Utility function with α = 1.08 in expected utility formulation, 
demonstrating a convex relationship between objective value and subjective value.  
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Table 1.1. The decision matrix for the example gambler computing Expected Value (EV) 
 
Table 1.2. The decision matrix for an example gambler with a concave utility function (α = 0.92) 
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1.3.3 Allais Paradox that violates expected utility theory 
      Expected utility theory has been developed as a normative model of rational choice under 
risk (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This model proposes that any individual who makes 
a decision under risk by maximizing expected utility should satisfy certain axioms of rational 
behavior. The four axioms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem include (1) 
completeness, (2) transitivity, (3) continuity, and (4) independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
Completeness assumes that an individual has well-defined preferences and is always able to 
make choices between any two alternatives. Transitivity assumes that the preference of an 
individual is consistent across any three options. Continuity assumes that when there are three 
lotteries (with the individual preferring A to B and B to C), there should exist a probability p 
such that the individual is indifferent between lottery B and the combination of A and C (pA + 
(1-p)C). Independence of irrelevant alternatives assumes that the preference of an individual 
should maintain the same order of preference between two alternatives when adding an irrelevant 
third alternative or when the two are presented independently of the irrelevant alternative. In this 
context, ‘irrelevant’ means of lower value than the other options and thus never chosen. In 
general, human subjects agree that all of the four axioms embody reasonable guidelines of 
rational behavior. However, several decades of studying human decision-making have revealed 
numerous classes of choices among risk options in which humans systematically violate the 
axioms of expected utility theory. 
      Allais (1953) proposed an example that shows an inconsistency of actually observed choices 
with the prediction of expected utility theory (Allais, 1953). In the Allais Paradox, there are two 
separate decision problems.  
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In the first problem, the subject chooses between two lotteries: 
Lottery A: $100 million with certainty (100%) 
Lottery B: $ 500 million with a probability of 10% 
                   $100 million with a probability of 89%            
                   Nothing with a probability of 1%          
In the second problem, the subject chooses between other two lotteries:  
Lottery C: $100 million with a probability of 11% 
                   Nothing with a probability of 89%          
Lottery D: $ 500 million with a probability of 10% 
                   Nothing with a probability of 90%          
      According to the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives in expected utility theory, 
a common consequence added to each of the two alternatives can be discarded and should not 
affect the preference of one alternative over the other. In the example, we can find the 89% of 
winning $100 million is a common consequence of the two decision problems. Lotteries C and D 
can be converted into lotteries A and B by replacing 89% of getting nothing ($0) with 89% of 
winning $100 million. The preference of an individual should be consistent across the two 
decision problems (i.e. choose either A and C or B and D) if he makes a decision based on the 
expected utility theory entails axiom of independence. Nevertheless, in actually observed 
choices, most rational people chose A over B and D over C, even though the expected value of 
each option can be easily calculated. Thus, the Allais Paradox demonstrates a violation of 
expected utility theory, especially the independence axiom. Examples of this behavior have led 
many behavioral economists and mathematical psychologists to formulate other models of 
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economic choices that can better explain these systematic choice biases and thus are better 
descriptive models than expected utility theory (Machina, 1987).    
1.3.4 Financial theories 
      In classical decision theory, the risk is commonly considered to reflect the variation of the 
distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihood, or their subjective value. In the expected 
utility theory, a subject’s risk-attitude is estimated by the nonlinearities in the revealed utility for 
monetary outcomes. It implicitly presupposes that one’s risk-attitude is primarily reflected by the 
mapping of monetary outcome (u(x), utility). Then people make a choice by integrating both the 
utility of a possible outcome (x) and its probability of occurrence (p) (i.e. the expected utility).  
      However, risk can be determined as one of the attributes of an option along with its expected 
value by calculating the variance of the probability distribution of possible gains and losses 
associated with a particular option (Arrow, 1965). In a financial context, the asset allocation 
problem requires an investment strategy that balances between the demand for reward 
maximization (average return of investment) and risk minimization (standard deviation of the 
investment’s return, σ). In the risk-return model, Markowitz (1952) estimated risk as to the 
variance of the distribution around the mean, or its range, and further extended the use of mean-
variance analysis (Markowitz, 1952). In this way, the preference of an individual between two 
extreme options (one with lowest σ and one with highest σ) in asset allocation can reveal a 
degree of risk aversion (Sharpe, 1964). Recently, Weber and Shafir (2004) suggested the use of a 
different variable, the coefficient of variation (CV), as a risk estimator, based on its better fit to 
human and animal choice behavior (E. U. Weber et al., 2004).  
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1.3.5 Risk for negative outcomes 
      While all theories discussed so far use different definitions of risk, a common assumption 
used in all of them is that the likelihood of choosing a risky option is affected by the variability 
of the option’s possible outcome. However, risk can also be assessed in a very different way. In 
1987, March and Shapira proposed that risk as a psychological variable in decision making is 
related to the probability and severity (i.e., magnitude) of potential losses (March & Shapira, 
1987). That is, the risk is not primarily related to the variability of outcomes independent of 
valence, but rather specifically to the probability distribution of negative outcomes. Thus, they 
defined a risky choice as one with the threat of a negative outcome. A similar concept has been 
suggested by Loewenstein et al. (2001)(Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
It should be notice here that the following discussion of risk is in the framework of 
economical or financial theory, so that risk mentioned below refers to the likelihood of choosing 
a risky option with specific variability of the potential outcome, rather than the preference for 
negative outcomes.      
1.4 Risk attitude as a stable trait or a context-dependent variable 
      So far, we have reviewed differences in the basic concepts or models used to define and 
explain risk attitude. A commonality among all of these models is that they treat risk preference 
as a stable personality trait. However, this assumption has been questioned recently, based on 
evidence that an individual’s risk attitude might be context-dependent.   
1.4.1 Risk attitude as a stable personality trait 
      Risk attitude is often seen as a fundamental, stable personality trait. Specific types of people 
are presumed to be more risk-prone in general, while other types of people are more risk-
avoiding. This perspective underlies research in which risk attitudes of people belonging to 
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different classified groups are compared (Figure 1.2, left). For example, an individual’s risk 
preference can be related to specific personality dimensions, developmental stage, culture, 
neuroanatomy, and neurophysiology.  
      The concept of a trait-like risk attitude is supported by a large number of studies. Lauriola 
and Levin (2001) showed that specific personality factors (the Big Five) can predict risk-taking 
behavior in the gain domain (Lauriola & Levin, 2001). People with high scores on ‘Openness to 
Experience’ are associated with greater risk-taking, while people with high scores on 
‘Neuroticism’ are associated with less risk-taking. People with personality traits such as 
sensation-seeking, impulsivity, and low self-control have also been associated with a risk-taking 
attitude (E. U. Weber et al., 2002). Dohmen et al., (2011) found that demographics factors like 
gender, age, height, and parental background had a significant impact on an individual’s 
willingness to take risks (Dohmen et al., 2011). Importantly, the individual risk attitudes were 
relatively stable across different contexts. The importance of demographic factors has been 
further supported by studies that have shown that females are less risk-seeking than males (Eckel 
& Grossman, 2008; Powell & Ansic, 1997). Age has also been confirmed to be a factor 
modulating risk attitude, in that risk aversion increases slowly between childhood and adulthood 
(Levin & Hart, 2003; Weller et al., 2011). Individuals from different cultures or countries often 
are differed in their risk preference  (M. Wang et al., 2017; E. U. Weber & Hsee, 1998). All these 
findings suggest the presence of a stable underlying personally trait that determines an individual 
risk preference.  
      These behavioral studies are further supported by a large number of neuroscientific studies 
that have linked specific features of human brains to individual risk attitudes. First, some 
anatomical characteristics are a stable biomarker for risk preference at the individual level. In 
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particular, people with a larger gray matter volume in the right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) 
have a greater tolerance for financial risk (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014a). 
      Second, neural activity levels in many brain areas predict risk preference. In an fMRI study, 
the degree to which neural activity in both the ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
responded to loss predicted individual differences in sensitivity to losses and gains, which is 
closely related to risk preference (Tom et al., 2007). Individual differences in risk-taking 
behavior are correlated with resting-state slow-wave electroencephalographic (EEG) activity in 
the PFC (Gianotti et al., 2009; Schutter & Van Honk, 2005) and with neural activity in PPC 
(Huettel et al., 2006).  
      Third, several lesion and stimulation studies demonstrate a causal relationship between 
specific brain regions and risk-based decision behavior. Patients with damage in the orbitofrontal 
(OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal (VMPFC) cortex display impaired decision-making behavior 
and risk-taking behavior in the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1996; Manes et al., 2002, p. 
2). They persist in selecting more cards from very risky decks even so they were 
disadvantageous because of infrequent, catastrophic losses. These patients also placed higher 
bets on simple probabilistic decisions (Bechara et al., 1996; Manes et al., 2002). In normal 
subjects, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) was used to disrupt neural activity 
in the right dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC). Following this manipulation, subjects became more risk-
seeking and were more likely to choose a larger potential reward even at a greater risk of penalty 
(Knoch et al., 2006). Likewise, another study used transcranial alternating current stimulation 
(tACS) to disrupt the theta-band (4-8Hz) oscillatory activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) and also found that subjects exhibited more risk-seeking behavior (Sela et al., 
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2012). In contrast, disrupting neural processing of the Intraparietal sulcus (IPS) with rTMS 
resulted in suppressed risk-taking behavior (Coutlee et al., 2016). 
       While these studies establish a relationship between brain activity in certain brain areas and 
the likelihood of accepting a risky option, it is less clear, if they reflect a stable neural trait, or if 
they reflect context-dependent conditions that might influence brain activity and through it 
behavior dynamically. 
1.4.2 Risk attitude as a context-dependent variable  
As outlined above, many studies have described risk attitude as a constant within an 
individual. However, the risk attitude of individuals can vary substantially across different 
behavioral domains (Figure 1.2).  When the risk attitudes of individuals in five content domains 
(financial decision, healthy/safety, recreational, ethical, and social decisions) were assessed, 
respondents’ degree of risk-taking was always consistent within each domain but highly domain-
specific (Blais & Weber, 2006; E. U. Weber et al., 2002). Also, the methods for measuring risk 
preference, i.e. the properties of the choice architecture strongly affect how individuals make a 
decision under risk (Pedroni et al., 2017). These findings suggest that risk attitudes of humans 
and animals are not always a stable personality trait, but rather a propensity that emerged during 
the process of decision-making in a context-dependent manner (Farashahi et al., 2018; Payne et 
al., 1992; Slovic, 1995).  
Internal factors related to energetic states and metabolic processes strongly influence risk-
preferences (Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001). A number of studies found that an organism’s 
sensitivity to risk is systematically influenced by its energy budget (metabolic reference point, 
i.e. the balance sheet of energy income against energy expenditure). Stephens (1981) suggested 
that an animal aiming to maximize survival probability should prefer safer options with lower 
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variance when above a metabolic reference point but should prefer risky options with higher 
variance when below a metabolic reference point. The metabolic reference point is determined 
by an equilibrium between metabolic costs and available energy (Stephens, 1981). Caraco et al., 
(1990) showed that a foraging bird tends to become more risk-seeking, when its metabolic 
energy requirement is increased by changing the ambient temperature or when its stored 
metabolic energy level is decreasing by fasting (Caraco et al., 1990). In contrast, monkeys are 
typically risk-seeking in laboratory gambling tasks but become more risk-averse when they are 
thirsty because of lower water levels (Yamada et al., 2013).  The metabolic state can also alter 
economic decision-making under risk in humans. An individual’s choice is generally risk-averse 
with a higher than expected impact of the meal while becoming risk-prone with a lower signal of 
nutrient intake (Symmonds et al., 2010). Moreover, human monetary decisions under risk are 
also systematically influenced by more abstract budget considerations, such as monetary assets. 
Pietras and Hackenberg (2001) found that humans’ risk preference is a function of their 
monetary assets: people are risk-averse if their momentary earnings decrease below a minimum 
level and risk-prone if their earnings exceed the minimum requirement level(Pietras & 
Hackenberg, 2001). This effect of current wealth levels on an individual’s risk-attitude has been 
confirmed in other studies (Juechems et al., 2017).  
External factors related to environmental richness also shift risk tolerance (Stephens, 2008).  
Since stochasticity in the availability of resources, such as food and water, is ubiquitous in 
natural environments, the risk-sensitivity of an organism to environmental richness reflects likely 
a phylogenetically conserved adaptation. In a rich environment, in which a foraging bird can 
expect to gain more energy than the minimally required rate, it behaves risk-averse and avoids 
options with high variance. In contrast, the foraging bird becomes risk-seeking and prefers 
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options with high variance in a poor environment, when it can expect an energetic deficit 
(Caraco, 1981).  
In addition, the size of the stakes also shifts risk-attitudes in humans and animals. People are 
less risk-averse when the stakes are small (Markowitz, 1952; Weber & Chapman, 2005). This 
effect is known as the “peanuts effect”. Similarly, animals are more risk-seeking when reward 
quality or amount is low (Craft et al., 2011; Hayden et al., 2008). Other external contextual 
factors that influence an individuals’ risk attitude include whether a choice is part of a series of 
repeated gambles or a one-shot gamble (Hayden & Platt, 2007) and whether probabilities and 
rewards are learned through experience or written description (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et 
al., 2004).  
In addition to these internal and external contextual influences on risk preference, there is one 
more very important factor that does not fall clearly in either category. Instead, the effect is 
related to the framework used by decision-makers to determine subjective value. As explained in 
greater detail in the next section, humans and other animals estimate the utility of an option not 
on an absolute scale, but rather as a relative gain or loss relative to a standard reference point. 
This standard reference point is typically the momentary relevant state (e.g., internal metabolic 
state or in the case of humans the more abstract state of current monetary assets). Humans show 
different risk-attitude for risky gains versus risky losses (Canessa et al., 2013; Vermeer et al., 
2014). Furthermore, how the problems are framed can also influence an individual’s risk 
preference. People tend to avoid risks if possible outcomes are presented in a way that highlights 
positive aspects, while more likely to take risks when the same outcomes are presented in a way 
that highlights their negative aspects (Gonzalez et al., 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979).  The 
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effect of positive (received reward) or negative (received punishment) feedback has also been 
shown to influence the subject’s risk preference (Vermeer & Sanfey, 2015).  
To sum up, there is a large amount of evidence both supporting that risk-attitude can be 
thought of as a stable trait (Figure 1.2 left) and that it can be thought of as state-dependent 
(Figure 1.2 right). The risk was initially seen as a trait, but recent evidence has shown this is not 
true. It turns out to show that humans (and possibly animals) can both show a systematic 
variance of risk across identifiable groups and simultaneously, each of the individuals can have 
contextual variations in risk attitude (i.e., both frameworks capture part of the truth). 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Risk attitude can be seen as a stable trait at the between-subject level or a 
context-dependent preference at the within-subject level. Left, different groups of people can 
exhibit systematically different risk-preference.  Right, internal and external factors can 
influence an individual’s momentary risk attitude.   
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1.5 Prospect theory  
      The difficulty of interpreting human choice behavior based on the predictions of expected 
utility theory and lead to the development of several alternative decision theories. The most 
successful and wide-ranging of these descriptive models is the Prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979). Prospect Theory was originally developed as a model of decision-making 
under risk and makes several assumptions about the way utility and probability are represented 
that differ from expected utility theory. These assumptions are necessary to explain human 
decision-making behavior.  
      First, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found strong evidence of what they referred to as the 
“reflection effect”. That is, decision-makers do not always exhibit a similar risk attitude when 
facing a risky gain or risky loss. Instead, people tend to be risk-averse in the gain domain while 
risk-seeking in the loss domain. To illustrate this, imagine that there are two separate decision 
problems.  
In the first problem, the subject chooses between two lotteries: 
Lottery A: A 100% chance of winning $3000 
Lottery B: An 80% chance of winning $4000, and a 20% chance of winning nothing 
In the second problem, the subject chooses between two other lotteries:  
Lottery C: A 100% chance of losing $3000 
Lottery D: An 80% chance of losing $4000, and a 20% chance of losing nothing 
      The empirical behavioral result shows that majority of people will be more likely to choose 
the sure option rather than the risky option in the first problem while being more likely to choose 
the risky option rather than the sure option in the second problem. Thus, most people prefer a 
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certain gain in the positive prospect but are strongly aversive to a certain loss in the negative 
prospect. Importantly, gains and losses are coded relative to a reference point, as indicated 
above. Thus, an individual’s utility function changes curvature close to the reference point (it is 
‘reflected’; see Figure 1.3A) and consequently risk preference reverses (i.e. risk-seeking for 
risky losses and risk-averse in risky gains). A change of reference point can further alter the 
preference order for prospects. It needs to be noted that the concept of the ‘reference point’ is 
somewhat unspecified in classical Prospect Theory. While it normally refers to a person’s current 
status quo, it can also refer to some future level of aspiration, or some other ‘psychological’ 
construct. In addition to the “reflection effect”, Kahneman and Tversky also suggested that 
subjects are more sensitive to losses than to gains. This effect is referred to as “loss aversion”. 
       Second, to explain the behavioral pattern seen in for example the Allais Paradox, Prospect 
Theory proposes the “certainty effect”. It assumes that people tend to overweigh outcomes that 
are certain, relative to outcomes that are merely probable. This is part of the more general idea 
that decision-makers use a distorted probability representation with biased (non-linear) 
weightings. For most subjects, an ‘inverted-S’ shape of the probability weighting function 
describes behavior best (Figure 1.3B). This function leads to an overweighting of small 
probabilities, an underweighting of large probabilities, and a sharp rise for certainty. This 
predicts that when winning probabilities are low, people should choose options that offer a larger 
gain (because they overestimate the probability of obtaining the gain). In this way the results of 
the Allais Paradox can be explained, where subjects accept a small but certain outcome over an 
uncertain outcome of a larger gain, despite the large probability of winning (A>B), while 
simultaneously choosing the option with the larger gain (D>C) when both options have a low 
probability of winning.     
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      The core concepts of prospect theory -- certainty effect, refection effect, the encoding of 
utility relative to a reference point, and loss aversion --not only successfully predict the choice in 
the Allais Paradox (as well as many other choice biases) but also well describe many contextual 
effects on risk attitude (e.g. outcomes are encoded as risky gains or risky losses relative to the 
current wealth level or the choice problem is represented in a positive or negative framework).  
1.5.1 Prospect theory model  
     The main mathematical components of the Prospect Theory model are the utility function and 
probability weighting function, which are both non-linear. Separate utility functions describe the 
gain and loss domain: 
𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛼 ,                        𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 ≥ 0 
𝑢(𝑥) = −𝜆. (−𝑥)𝛼, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 < 0 
The parameter α controls the curvature of the utility functions in both the gain and loss 
conditions. The loss aversion effect is incorporated by adding a loss aversion parameter to the 
utility function in the loss domain (Figure 1.3A).  
      The probability weighting function permits probabilities to be weighted nonlinearly. There 
are a number of different functions that have been suggested in the literature. Here we show the 
probability weighting function in a Prelec form with a single parameter: 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−(−𝑙𝑛 (𝑝)𝛾)) 
The parameter γ allows the probability weighting curve to be S (or inverse-S) shaped (Figure 
1.3B). That is an initially concave (convex) then convex (concave) curve, so that small 
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probabilities are overweighted (underweighted) while large probabilities are underweighted 
(over-weighted).  
      By fitting this model to empirical data, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) found that most people 
are best described by an S-shaped value function (0<α<1) with loss aversion (λ>1). It indicated 
that people are risk-averse in the gain domain while risk-seeking in the loss domain. In addition, 
most people show an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function (0<γ<1). This leads to low 
probabilities to be overweighed and high probabilities to be underweighted.  
 
 
Figure 1.3. The utility function and probability function in the prospect theory. (A) Utility 
u(x) is a concave utility of gains (x≥0) and a convex function of losses (x<0). (B) Probability 
weighting function w(p) is a four-fold nonlinear function of p. Smaller probabilities are 
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1.5.2 Neurophysiological basis of Prospect theory  
      Prospect theory has dominated the analysis of decision-making under risk for decades. Non-
human primates, such as Capuchin monkeys and Rhesus monkeys show several hallmark biases 
underlying Prospect Theory, just like humans, including reference dependence and loss aversion 
(M. K. Chen et al., 2006; Stauffer et al., 2015). This suggests that there is an evolutionarily 
ancient decision-making system in the primate brain responsible for generating these risk 
preference characteristics shared by humans and animals (for a review see, Trepel et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, the assumptions of Prospect Theory remain ad-hoc and it is not known if they 
reflect any underlying brain mechanism. Modern cognitive neuroscience has therefore used 
imaging, lesion, and stimulation studies to investigate possible links between neural mechanisms 
and Prospect Theory. The various findings are listed in Table 1.4. 
Human imaging studies  
      With the rise of modern neural activity imaging techniques (e.g. PET, fMRI), researchers 
have begun to investigate the neural mechanisms of risky decision making. Some studies have 
searched more generally for brain regions that encode behaviorally relevant variables, such as 
risk, uncertainty, or variance of the possible outcome. These studies have identified a distributed 
network of brain areas. An early positron emission tomography (PET) study found that OFC and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were implicated in coding risk in terms of increased uncertainty 
of potential gains or losses (Ernst et al., 2002). This finding was confirmed and extended by 
reports that the fMRI signal in the OFC, ACC, as well as insular cortex (IC), responded to 
different levels of risk in a gambling task  (Critchley et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2003).  
      Several fMRI studies showed that activities in separate neural systems are correlated with 
risk-avoiding and risk-seeking behavior, respectively. One study showed that a risk-seeking 
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attitude was positively correlated with activity in the medial part or (OFC), while a risk-averse 
attitude was strongly associated with the activity in the lateral OFC (Tobler et al., 2007). A 
similar anatomical division with respect to risk-attitude was also found in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC). The BOLD signal in the dorsomedial PFC was negatively correlated with risk-seeking 
while the BOLD signal in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, adjacent to DLPFC) was positively 
correlated with risk-averseness (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2009). 
      Other studies have more specifically tested the conceptual assumptions underlying the 
Prospect Theory model. They have searched for the neural basis of gain/loss-specific value 
encoding, the reference point, loss aversion, probability distortion, and the predicted effects of 
these factors on risk attitude. 
      First, a critical assumption underlying Prospect Theory is the idea that utility is represented 
differently for gains and losses and that both utility representations are using a relative 
framework for encoding value. Whether or not gains and losses are encoded separately is a 
contested issue in the field. Several regions including striatum, VMPFC, ventral ACC, and 
medial OFC, increase their activation with an increased size of the potential gain. Importantly, 
the same network of areas also decreases activity as the size of the potential loss increased (Tom 
et al., 2007). This supports the idea of a distributed circuit that encodes uniformly value-
increases and decreases. On the other hand, potential gains and losses should elicit different 
emotional and behavioral responses. A potential gain should elicit positive arousal and promote 
approach behavior, while a potential loss should elicit negative arousal and promote avoidance 
behavior (Knutson & Greer, 2008). This hypothesis is supported by accumulating evidence that 
qualitatively and quantitatively different processes may be engaged in risk-taking to obtain gains 
and to avoid losses (Levin et al., 2012). The anterior IC and the amygdala are suggested to be the 
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node encoding anticipation of loss, while the ventral striatum is suggested to be the node 
encoding anticipation of gain (Breiter et al., 2001; Canessa et al., 2013; Kahn et al., 2002; 
Knutson, Adams, et al., 2001; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Yacubian et al., 2006). This model 
suggested that risky decision-making in the gain and loss domain may be processed in separate 
systems that are highly involved in positive or negative emotional arousal. This finding supports 
the general assumptions of Prospect Theory. 
      Second, substantial effort has also been spending on attempts to find the neural 
representation of the probability weighting function. Human fMRI studies have found neural 
responses that are involved in the representation of nonlinear probability mapping (Berns et al., 
2008; Hsu et al., 2009). Smith et al., (2009) found that several brain regions including the insula, 
amygdala, and posterior cingulate cortex elicited more activation for higher reward magnitude 
while the anterior cingulate cortex elicited more activation for higher reward probability (Smith 
et al., 2009). A PET study in humans also found that the availability of striatal dopamine D1 
receptor is correlated with the degree of nonlinearity in the probability weighting function that 
best fits behavior across subjects (Takahashi et al., 2010).   
Lesion and stimulation studies 
      Case studies from patients with brain injury allow the investigation of the causal relationship 
between different brain regions and decision-related functions. Amygdala damage eliminates 
monetary loss aversion (De Martino et al., 2010). Patients with insula damage showed fewer 
risky choices than healthy controls in the gain domain and also became less sensitive to 
differences in expected value between options (Weller et al., 2009).  
       Another population that allows for causal experiments is Parkinson’s patients. When these 
patients are off their dopamine medication that reverses an abnormally low level of dopamine, 
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they are more sensitive to negative outcomes (punishments) than positive outcomes (rewards) in 
a learning task. The application of dopamine medication reverses this bias(Frank et al., 2004). A 
followed study showed that administration of a dopaminergic drug (a D2/D3 receptor antagonist) 
modulated humans’ subjective weighting probabilities in the gain domain (Ojala et al., 2018). 
These studies show that dopamine plays an important, but differential, role in gain and loss-
specific feedback mechanisms.    
      In healthy subjects, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of a specific brain region 
changes activity in the affected region. When tDCS was applied over the right and left prefrontal 
cortex to include its cortical excitability, the subjects became more risk-seeking in the gain 
domain, but more risk-averse in the loss domain (Ye et al., 2015, 2016). This further supports the 
idea that the gain and loss domain engage at least partially separate circuits, even in the same 
brain region.  
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Table 1.4. Summary of neural systems hypothesized to be involved in the major aspects of 
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Animal models and associated challenges       
      Human imaging studies and non-invasive stimulation techniques have started to map the 
network of brain areas responsible for decisions under risk. Nevertheless, the interpretations of 
the neuronal activity pattern are limited due to the limits of spatial and temporal resolution of the 
techniques available in humans. Therefore, to truly understand the mechanisms underlying 
decision-making, it is necessary to investigate and manipulate brain activity on the level of 
neuronal circuits. This is only possible in animal models. Thus, it is of critical importance to 
develop find out corresponding behavioral paradigms in animals to help us further investigate the 
underlying neural mechanism.   
      Accumulating evidence has shown that animals show specific behavior characteristics in line 
with prospect theory. As mentioned above, capuchin monkeys were found to exhibit trading 
behavior based on a nonlinear utility and probability weighting function (M. K. Chen et al., 
2006).  Similar behavioral effects have also been found in rhesus macaques. Stauffer et al., 
(2015) first demonstrated that macaque monkeys exhibit probability distortion similar to the 
inverse S-shaped probability function proposed in the prospect theory (Stauffer et al., 2015). 
Farashahi et al., (2018) found that macaque monkeys’ risk attitudes differed in the gain and loss 
domain based on a nonlinear and asymmetric utility function (Farashahi et al., 2018). Macaque 
monkeys are also found to behave like humans and flexibly adjust their risk preference with 
changing satiation levels (Fujimoto & Minamimoto, 2019). 
      Reward magnitude, reward probability, risk (outcome variance), and risk-attitude are 
important factors for decision-making under risk. Recent studies in macaques have shown that all 
these decision-related variables are encoded in a distributed network throughout the brain at the 
level of single neurons.  
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      Neural correlates of subjective value have been found in numerous brain areas. By training 
monkey in a matching task, Sugrue et al., (2004) found the activity of LIP neurons 
parametrically track the subjective value of saccades in a trial-by-trail fashion, suggesting lateral 
intra-parietal (LIP) neurons carry information related to the probability that a saccade to each 
target would result in a reward (Sugrue et al., 2004). Similar action-value signals have been 
found in SEF neurons (X. Chen & Stuphorn, 2015; So & Stuphorn, 2010). Amiez et al., (2006) 
found that ACC responses reflected expected juice quantity, which is related to both reward 
(juice) quantity and reward probability. Inactivation of the ACC impaired the monkey’s ability to 
choose the optimal target and reduced it to chance level (Amiez et al., 2006). 
      Neural correlates of reward probability or corresponding outcome variance are also found in 
various subcortical and cortical areas. An electrophysiological study in non-human primates 
found that dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain encode not the only reward but also its variance 
(Fiorillo et al., 2003). O’Neill and Shultz, (2010) found a distinct group of neurons in the 
orbitofrontal cortex that reward risk, independently from reward value (O’Neill & Schultz, 
2010). Orbitofrontal neurons that encode reward probability also have been found in rodents 
performing an olfactory discrimination task (van Duuren et al., 2009). Posterior Cingulate Cortex 
neurons also increase their activity when monkeys make more risky choices (McCoy & Platt, 
2005). This might indicate that they encode the degree of risk. However, it might also reflect 
increased subjective value, because the monkeys preferred riskier options. 
      Several brain regions have been proposed in controlling risk attitude. Reversible inactivation 
of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in rats promotes risk-taking (Ishii et al., 2012), indicating that 
AIC is causally involved in risky decision making. Conversely, inactivation of SEF reduces the 
monkey’s risk-seeking behavior (Chen & Stuphorn, 2018).   
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1.6 Aims, approaches, and chapter overview of this dissertation  
As the literature we reviewed above indicates, a large body of work has aimed to identify 
the neural mechanisms of decision-making under risk. Recent interest centered on understanding 
the neuronal computations underlying the core concepts used in prospect theory. Neuroimaging 
experiments have identified a wide range of brain regions encoding signals expected by prospect 
theory. However, a barrier to a deeper mechanistic understanding is the lack of an animal model 
allowing to investigate gain/loss-specific value signals, probability (or risk) signals, as well as 
reference-point-related signals at a neuronal level.  
To this end, we recorded neuronal activity in monkeys performing a token-based gambling 
task developed to test their risk attitude in a gain or loss domain with different starting token 
assets. We were particularly interested in the anterior insular cortex (AIC), since human fMRI 
studies have suggested its crucial role in signaling risk-aversive behavior (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005), the current state of the self (Craig & Craig, 2009) and loss aversion (Canessa et al., 2013). 
We hypothesized that AIC may be a central node within the risk-attitude network, which 
monitors the contextual factors that influence risk attitudes. We proposed that neurons in the AIC 
encode the behavioral context of the decision and shape risk attitude by modulating activities in 
the risk-decision network which selects between seeking or avoiding a risky option.  
To investigated these issues, we (Aim 1) designed a token-based gambling task that allowed 
us to observe monkeys’ changing risk attitude in varying behavioral contexts (outcomes 
represent gain or loss; different starting token assets) (Chapter 2), (Aim 2) developed 
computational models to predict monkey’s risk attitude or behavioral choice based on the 
decision-related variables (Chapter 3), and (Aim 3) found neuronal correlates of decision-related 
variables (e.g. token asset, gain/loss context, as well as expected values and risk of options) and 
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neuronal responses reflect prospect theory model components in AIC with an 
electrophysiological recording (Chapter 4).  
Finally, the dissertation will close with a conclusion, proposing a possible role of AIC in 
decision-making under risk, highlighting the innovation and contribution of these works, and 
suggestions of future directions.  
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Chapter 2 
Behaviors of monkeys performing the token-based gambling task 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 General  
      Two male rhesus monkeys (Monkey G: 7.2 kg, Monkey O: 9.5 kg) were trained to perform a 
token-based gambling task in this study. Monkeylogic software (Asaad & Eskandar, 2008) 
(https://www.brown.edu/Research/monkeylogic/) was used to control task events, stimuli, and 
reward, as well as monitor and store behavioral events. During the experimental sessions, the 
monkey was seated in an electrically insulated enclosure with its head restrained, facing a video 
monitor. Eye positions were monitored with an infrared corneal reflection system, EyeLink 1000 
(SR Research) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. All analyses were performed using self-written 
Matlab code unless noted otherwise. 
2.1.2 Token-based gambling task 
To investigate risk attitude in the gain and loss context with different wealth levels, two 
monkeys were trained in a token-based gambling task. The task was based on a previously 
published task design (Seo & Lee, 2009) and consisted of two types of trials: choice trials and 
no-choice trials. In choice trials, two targets (a sure option and a gamble option) were presented 
on the screen. Monkeys were allowed to choose one of the options by making a saccade to the 
corresponding target. Choice trials allowed us to measure the monkey’s risk attitude by testing 
their propensity to choose the gamble option across different combinations of the expected value 
of the gamble and sure option (Figure 2.1). In no-choice trials, only one target (either a sure 
option or a gamble option) was presented on the screen so the monkey was forced to make a 
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saccade to the given target. Comparing the neuronal activity in choice and no-choice trials 
allowed us to identify neuronal signals specifically related to decision-making. The choice and 
no-choice trials were pseudo-randomly interleaved in blocks so that each block consisted of all 
24 choice trials and 13 no-choice trials. 
2.1.2.1 Visual Cues that indicate token outcome and outcome probability  
All options in this task were represented by sets of colored squares, with the color of the 
square indicating the token amount that could be gained or lost (token outcome) and the 
proportion of the square filled by a given color indicating the probability that this event would 
take place (outcome probability) (Figure 2.1). The sure options were single-colored squares 
indicating a certain outcome (gain or loss of token). There were 7 different colors used for sure 
options representing the number of tokens that were gained or lost ([-3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3]). 
The gamble options were two-colored squares indicating two possible outcomes and their 
probabilities. Six gamble options were used in this task. Three of the gambles resulted in either a 
gain of 3 or 0 token(s), but with different outcome probabilities (i.e. token [+3, 0] with the 
probability combination of [0.1, 0.9], [0.5, 0.5], or [0.75, 0.25]). Another three gambles resulted 
either in a loss of 0 or 3 token(s) with different outcome probabilities (i.e. token [0, -3] with 
probability combination of [0.1, 0.9], [0.5, 0.5], or [0.75, 0.25]). The choice trials were divided 
into a gain domain and a loss domain (Figure 2.1). 
2.1.2.2 Context of gain and loss 
The choice trials were divided into a gain context and a loss context (Figure 2.1). In the gain 
context, the three gamble options that resulted in either a gain of +3 or 0 tokens with different 
outcome probabilities were paired with four sure options that spanned the range of gain 
outcomes (i.e. [0, +1, +2, +3]). These resulted in 12 possible combinations of sure and gamble 
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options. In the loss context, the gamble options resulting either in a loss of 3 or 0 tokens were 
paired with the four sure options that spanned the range of losing outcomes (i.e. [0, -1, -2, -3)). 
Thus, the loss contexts comprised another 12 possible combinations of sure and gamble options. 
This resulted in a total of 24 different combinations of reward option combinations (half in the 
gain context and the other half in the loss context) that were offered in choice trials. In the no-
choice trials, all 13 different reward options (7 sure and 6 gamble options) which were used in 
the choice trials were presented in isolation. 
 
Figure 2.1. Set of choice options in the gain and loss context. Each option is a square (x 
degree), of which the color(s) indicated the possible outcome(s) (-3 to +3, in units of token 
change), and the portion of the colored area indicated the probability (10%, 50%, 75%, 100%) of 
the corresponding outcome to be realized. The choice trials consisted of two types (gain vs. loss 
context), and there was always a sure option paired with a gamble option – i.e., only the 
combination of [sure gain vs. gamble gain] and [sure loss vs. gamble loss] was available. In 
forced-choice trials, only one option was presented, which could be either a sure option or a 
gamble option (gain or loss).  
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2.1.2.3 Token as a secondary reinforcer 
       To investigate how critical contextual factors including the context of gain/loss and current 
token asset affect the risk attitude of monkeys, it required us to introduce the token system so 
that the monkey could experience losses, that is a reduction of welfare from its current state. In 
our version of the token-based gambling task, the monkey had to acquire multiple tokens (say six 
in this research) before he receives the immediate reward (600 µl water). In each trial, the 
currently owned token number was presented by a token cue. The token cue consisted of 6 
circles whose number of filled circles represented the token number the monkeys owned in the 
current state. After each outcome, the token cue was updated to indicate the new token number.  
2.1.2.4 Task procedure  
       A choice trial began with the appearance of a fixation point surrounded by the token cue. 
After the monkey had maintained its gaze at the central fixation point (±1° of visual angle) for a 
delay period (0.5-1s), two choice targets were displayed on two randomly chosen locations 
among the four quadrants on the screen. The monkey indicated its choice by shifting its gaze to 
the target. Following the saccade, the token cue moved to surround the chosen target and the 
unchosen target disappeared from the screen. The monkey was required to keep fixating the 
chosen target for 450-550ms, after which the chosen target changed either color or shape. If the 
chosen target was a gamble option, it changed from a two-colored square to a single-colored 
square to indicate the outcome of the gamble. The color represented the amount of gained or lost 
tokens in the present trial. If the chosen target was a sure option, the shape changed from a 
square to a circle, serving as a control for the change in the visual display that occurred during 
gamble option choices. Finally, after an additional delay (500ms) the token cue was updated. If 
the owned token number was equal to or more than 6 at this stage, the monkey received a 
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standard fluid reward after an additional 450ms waiting time. At the beginning of the next trial, 
the remaining tokens were displayed with filled circles. Otherwise, if the owned token number 
was smaller than 6, the monkey did not receive a fluid reward and the updated token cue was 
displayed at the beginning of the next trial. If the owned token number was smaller than 0, the 
inter-trial-interval (ITI) for the next trial would be prolonged (300 ms per owed token).  
      The monkey was required to maintain fixation on the point until it disappeared for reward 
delivery. If the monkey broke fixation in either one of the two time periods, the trial was aborted 
and no reward was delivered. The following trial repeated the condition of the aborted trial, 
contingent on the time of fixation break. A trial in which the monkey broke fixation before the 
choice was followed by a trial in which the same choice targets were presented, but at different 
locations. This ensured that the monkey sampled every reward contingency evenly and could not 
prepare a saccade in advance. On the other hand, a trial in which the monkey broke fixation after 
the choice was followed by a no-choice trial in which only the chosen target was presented. If the 
monkey broke fixation following a gambling choice, but before the gamble outcome was 
revealed, the same gamble cue was presented. If the monkey broke fixation following a sure 
choice or after a gambling outcome was revealed, the same sure cue was presented. This ensured 
that the monkey could not escape a choice once it was made and had to experience its outcome. 
All trials were followed by a regular 1500-2000ms ITI. The schedule of the token-based 
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Figure 2.2. Schematic of the token-based gambling task. Each trial starts with a fixation dot at 
the center of the screen. Upon the monkey fixated to the central dot, the current number of 
tokens it has was presented (filled circles of the hexagonal placeholder). Following 0.5-1s delay, 
one (‘forced-choice’ trial) or two (‘choice’ trial) options were presented (detailed in (b)), and the 
monkey indicated its choice by making a saccade to the target. The unchosen option then 
disappeared, and the current number of tokens was presented again in the surround of the chosen 
target. The outcome of the chosen target revealed after a delay (0.45-0.55 s), indicated by the 
color change of the square, and the number of tokens that the monkey possessed was updated 
accordingly. The monkey was rewarded (600uL of water) whenever it collected six tokens or 
more at the end of the trial. The Shadowed area indicated the choice period during which the 
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2.1.2.5 Saccade detection   
Eye movements were detected offline using a computer algorithm (saccade detection function) 
that searched first for significantly elevated velocity (30◦/s). Saccade initiations were defined as 
the beginning of the monotonic change in eye position lasting 15ms before the high-velocity 
gaze shift. A valid saccade for the choice was further admitted to the behavioral analysis if it 
started from the central fixation window (1° x 1° of visual angle) and ended in the peripheral 
target window (2.5° x 2.5° of visual angle).   
2.1.3 Description of monkeys’ behavior  
      Fixation behavior: We examined whether and how monkeys’ motivations to initiate a new 
trial were influenced by the outcome of the previous trial and the start token number of the 
current trial. We used two behavioral signals as indications of the monkey’s motivational state: 
(1) fixation latency (i.e., the time from fixation point onset until fixation by the monkey) and (2) 
fixation break ratio (i.e., the frequency with which the monkey failed to fixate on the fixation 
point long enough to initiate target onset). We used linear regression models to test if there was a 
significant relationship between each of the two variables describing the motivational state and 
the variables describing the history and current state. 
      Response time: We examined whether and how response times were influenced by different 
decision-related variables.  For each trial, response time was defined as the period between target 
onset and saccade initiation estimated by the saccade detection function. The response time 
dataset in each condition (e.g. trials from the context of gain or loss, trials with different start 
token numbers, trials with different expected values of the chosen option (chosen EV), or trials 
with different absolute values of difference of expected values among the gamble and sure option 
(|ΔEVgs|)) was fitted with an ex-Gaussian distribution algorithm (Zandbelt, 2014) 
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(https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.971318.v2). It returned three besting-fitting parameter 
values of the ex-Gaussian distribution: the mean μ, the variance σ, and the skewness τ of the 
distribution. We used a permutation test to determine if the mean RTs of trials from the gain and 
loss context. We used linear regression models to test whether there was a significant 
relationship between mean RTs and start token number, chosen EV, or |ΔEVgs|.   
2.2 Results  
2.2.1 General behavior  
        In this task, the monkey had to collect a sufficient number of tokens (≥6) to receive a 
standard fluid reward (600μl water). Because the maximum number of tokens that could be 
earned in a single trial was three, the monkeys had to accumulate the necessary tokens over 
multiple trials. The modes of inter-reward-trial number for the two monkeys were 3 and 5, 
respectively (Figure 2.3), suggesting the monkeys usually needed to work for 3-5 trials to earn 
enough token (secondary reward) to exchange for the fluid reward (primary reward).   
         Both monkeys learned the use of tokens, as indicated by the observation that their fixation 
behavior was strongly influenced by their token assets. Monkeys fixated faster and were less 
likely to break their fixation (resulting in abortion of the trial) (Figure 2.4) when they had larger 
token assets at the start of the trial, and when they received more tokens from the previous trial. 
These results suggest that monkeys understood the use of tokens as secondary reinforcers, and 
thus were more motivated when they owned more and received more tokens before they earned 
the primary reinforcer (the fluid reward). 
       Both monkeys were sensitive to the expected value (EV, i.e. the product of potential 
gaining/losing tokens and its corresponding probabilities) of the option, as indicated by the 
observation that their response time (RT) was strongly influenced by the expected value of 
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options. The RTs were longer when the EV differences between options were smaller, 
suggesting monkeys took more time to make the decision when the task difficulty increases 
(Figure 2.6e-f). Besides, the RTs were shorter when the EV of chosen options was larger, 




Figure 2.3. The Inter-Reward-Trial number for each monkey. Monkeys used to accumulate 
the necessary (6) tokens for 3-5 successive trials. Error bars indicate SEM or estimates across 
sessions (session number = 37 for each monkey).  
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Figure 2.4. Effect of current token asset and token outcome history on fixation latency and 
fixation break ratio. 
(a) Standardized regression coefficients (SRCs) for fixation latency (latency to fixate on the 
center point at the beginning of the trial before the token cue appears). Error bars indicate SEM 
of SRCs across sessions.  
(b) Fixation latency as a function of the previous outcome. Regression coefficient (β) between 
fixation latency and the token number won or losses of the previous trial.  
(c) Fixation latency as a function of the current token asset. Regression coefficient (β) between 
fixation latency and the start token number of the current trial.  
(d) Standardized regression coefficients (SRCs) for fixation break ratio (failure to hold fixation 
on the center point long enough for token cues to appear). Error bars indicate SEM of SRCs 
across sessions.  
(e) Fixation break ratio as a function of the previous outcome. Regression coefficient (β) 
between the percentage of trials with fixation breaks and the token number won or losses of the 
previous trial.  
(f)Fixation break ratio as a function of the current token asset. Regression coefficient (β) 
between the percentage of trials with fixation breaks and the start token number of the current 
trial.  
Error bars indicate SEM or estimates across sessions (session number  = 37 for each monkey).  
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2.2.2 Monkeys’ risky choices were influenced by the context of gain and loss and current 
wealth level 
      We found that monkeys’ choices were influenced by the context of gain and loss. Both 
monkeys were more likely to choose the gamble option than the sure option (Figure 2.5 left; t-
test; Monkey G, P(Gamble)=59%, p<10-4; Monkey O, P(Gamble)=67%, p<10-4) and were even 
more likely to do so in the gain context than in the loss context (Figure 2.5 left; paired t-test, 
p<10-4 for both Monkey G and Monkey O).  
      We have also found that monkeys’ choices were influenced by the number of tokens they had 
upon the trial start (‘start token’, or ‘asset’), and an interaction between the context of gain and 
loss and the start token number. Specifically, in the gain context, the probability of which the 
monkey chose the gamble option (P(Gamble)) decreased as the start token number increased 
(Figure 2.5 right; green dashed line; regression analysis; Monkey G, β = -0.044, p<10-4; 
Monkey O, β = -0.035, p<10-4). While in the loss context, the P(Gamble) exhibited a tendency to 
increase as the start token number increased (Figure 2.5 right; red dashed line; regression 
analysis; Monkey G, β = 0.028, p<10-4; Monkey O, β = -0.001, p = 0.8). These results suggested 
that, as the monkey had more tokens in hand, it became more conservative (i.e., less willing to 
gamble) for a greater win; but was more willing to take a risky gamble to avoid a potential loss. 
This is in line with the observation of humans that human subjects tend to be more risk-aversive 
when facing a potential gain, and more risk-seeking when facing a potential loss as their asset 
increases1.  
 46  
 
 
Figure 2.5. Choice probability under different contextual factors. Left. The probability of 
monkey choosing gamble option in gain/loss contexts. The Upper and lower panels represent 
data from two different monkeys, respectively. Green: gain context; Red: loss context. Error 
bars: S.E.M; **** p<10-4, paired t-test. Right. The probability of monkey choosing gamble 
option, plotted by context and the start token number. Green: gain context; Red: loss context. 
Error bars: S.E.M; n.s.: not statistically significant (p>0.05), ** p<10-2, *** p<10-3, **** p<10-4 
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2.2.3 Monkeys’ response times were influenced by the context of gain and loss and current 
wealth level 
      Monkeys’ response times (RTs, the interval between stimulus onset and the saccade 
initiation) were also influenced by these contextual factors. Both monkeys responded slower in 
the loss context than in the gain context (Figure 2.6a-b; permutation test; monkey G: RT gain = 
204.79ms, RTloss = 246.51ms, p < 10-3; monkey O: RT gain = 175.07ms, RTloss = 206.00ms, p < 
10-3), and when they had more tokens (Figure 2.6c-d; regression analysis; monkey G: βStartTkn = 
2.83, p = 0.19; monkey O: βStartTkn = 3.50, p < 10-2). These suggest that monkeys are more 
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Figure 2.6. Response time of monkey’s choice. (a) Distribution of response times when 
monkeys made decisions in the gain (green) and loss (red) context for each monkey. Histograms 
with light color indicate the raw data distribution and curves with dark color indicate the best-
fitting (ex-Gaussian) distribution.  
(b) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of response times in the gain (green) and loss (red) 
context.  
(c) Distribution of response times when monkeys made decisions with different start token 
numbers. The color gradients from light to dark blue indicate token numbers from 0 to 5. 
(d) CDF of response times with different start token numbers.  
(e) Distribution of response times when monkeys made decisions with different absolute values 
of expected value difference between a gamble and sure option (|ΔEVgs|s). The black color 
gradients indicate |ΔEVgs| from small to large.  
(f) CDF of response times with different |ΔEVgs|s).  
(g) Distribution of response times when monkeys made decisions with different EVs of the 
chosen option. The color gradients indicate chosen values from small to large.  
(h) CDF of response times with different EV of the chosen option.  
One monkey took more time to make a choice when the difference expected value between 
options was small (Figure 2.6e-f; regression analysis; monkey O: β RT_|ΔEVgs|= -5.11, p < 10-3), 
indicating a task-difficulty dependent response time. Yet another monkey showed no significant 
difference to this variable (Figure 2.6e-f; regression analysis; monkey G: β RT_|ΔEVgs|= -0.50, p = 
0.74). Furthermore, Both monkeys made faster choices as the expected value of chosen option 
increased (Figure 2.6g-h; regression analysis; monkey G: β RT_StartTkn= 2.83, p = 0.19; monkey 
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2.2.4 Value evaluation in a relative framework  
        The fact that monkeys were sensitive to the context of the decision and their risk preference 
changed across contexts suggests that monkeys evaluate each available option not thoroughly 
depending on the final status it may result (the ‘prospect’, i.e., the number of tokens at the end of 
the trial), but also depending on how the final status will be reached (by gaining or losing 
tokens). This is best demonstrated by the contrast of trials whose end token number were 
identical, but were resulted from either gaining or losing tokens (Figure 2.7; paired t-test; 
monkey G & O: p<10-2 for all end token numbers, except end token numbers 2&5 for monkey G, 
and number 5 for monkey O). Given the ‘prospect’ (end state) was the same, monkeys chose 
more gambles when such prospect was offered as a gain, as compared to when it was offered as a 
loss.  
      These results support that monkeys used the relative framework -- option value was defined 
as token changes relative to a reference point (the starting token number) but not the absolute 
framework -- option was defined purely by the token number at the end of the trial (which reflect 
how close the monkey is to collect enough token and reap a fluid reward) for option evaluation 
in this task.   
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Figure 2.7. Monkeys had different risk attitudes when the identical end token states were 
results from gaining or losing token(s). The probability of monkey choosing gamble option, 
plotted by context and the end token number. Green: gain context; Red: loss context. Error bars: 
S.E.M; n.s.: not statistically significant (p>0.05), ** p<10-2, *** p<10-3, **** p<10-4 in paired t-
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2.3 Discussion  
      The behavioral results shown above confirmed that the monkeys understand the meaning of 
the visual cues indicating the change in token number and outcome probability as well as the 
goal of the task (i.e. gambling to collect token for exchanging water reward). In the task, we 
found that the monkeys’ attitudes toward risk differed in the gain and loss context. The monkeys 
showed an overall tendency of risk-seeking in both the gain and loss domains. However, they 
were more inclined to the gamble choices when facing a risky gain than when facing a risky loss. 
Furthermore, we showed that the token assets, i.e., the number of already owned tokens at the 
beginning of the trial, influenced the monkey’s risk attitude. This effect varied in the gain and the 
loss domain. With increasing token assets, monkeys are prone to choose the gamble option less 
often in the gain domain, but more or equally often in the loss domain. Thus, we found both the 
context of gain and loss and the wealth level (token assets) were important variables that can 
modulate monkeys’ risk attitudes.  
2.3.1 Relative framework in the token-based gambling task 
      Monkeys’ behaviors were sensitive to both the initial wealth level and potential gaining or 
losing outcomes (Figure 2.5) demonstrating that they made decisions based on the potential gain 
or losses relative to their current wealth (the reference point) rather than in absolute terms. 
Further analysis found that monkeys displayed different preferences to risky choices when the 
same final wealth levels resulted from different starting points (Figure 2.7) again in favor of a 
relative rather than an absolute framework.  
      This relative framework is one of the core concepts of prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979) and can provide several insights. First, the starting point can strongly influence 
how people subjectively evaluate a specific outcome. For example, if two workers both receive a 
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bonus of $1,000, the one whose regular salary was $1,000 will be much happier than the one 
whose regular was $10,000. The same increments (or decrements) can be evaluated as 
dramatically different in value, when their starting points are different. This is consistent with 
our finding that monkeys became less risk-seeking when their current wealth level increased (in 
the gain context). Second, people are most interested in their relative change in wealth as 
opposed to their actual final wealth. Thus, people tend to feel better when their income gets 
raised from $500 to $2,500 than when it is raised from $2,000 to $2,500. That is, two options 
that resulted in the same final state can be evaluated differentially when they have different 
starting points. Third, the outcome of an option can be evaluated as a gain or a loss relative to a 
starting point. Suppose there are two people, both receiving a salary of $2,500. For the one 
whose previous salary was $2,000, the new salary would be seen as a gain, while for the other 
whose the previous salary was $3,000, the new salary would be a loss. This is consistent with our 
finding in Figure 2.7 that monkeys were sensitive to gains and losses relative to a start token 
number rather than the end token state, so that monkeys exhibited different risk preferences 
when the identical end token state resulted from a gain or a loss. Finally, how the outcomes of 
gains and losses are framed by subjects strongly influence their risk-attitudes. People tend to 
avoid risk and choose the option that guarantees a positive outcome when two offered choices 
are both framed as positive (i.e., a gain). On the flip side, people will be more likely to take risky 
choices rather than the option that guarantees a negative outcome when two offered choices are 
both framed as negative. This behavioral phenomenon is well known as the ‘framing effect’. 
This effect has not been examined clearly in our present study yet. It will be interesting to design 
a task that well controls how animals ‘frame’ the same choice situation in a positive or negative 
way to see how the frame influences their choice behaviors. These behavioral phenomena 
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described above can be applied to a diverse range of situations in economics, financial, politics, 
or marketing fields.       
2.3.2 The effects of outcome history and working memory on the decision process 
      The token gambling task requires the monkey to collect tokens in successive trials to obtain a 
primary reward. Therefore, the starting point of each trial is the result of past trials, which means 
that the trials are dependent on each other. As described above, the monkeys’ fixation behavior 
systematically changes based on the past token outcome and current token number (Figure 2.4). 
It not only shows that monkeys paid attention to the token cue and were aware of their progress 
in obtaining rewards but also shows that monkeys were sensitive to the outcomes of previous 
trials. Notably, the visual cue that represented token information was not present in the early 
fixation period. Thus, the fact that monkeys’ fixation behaviors were biased by the token asset 
suggests that the monkeys can hold the currently owned token number in working memory. 
These results suggest that working memory of recent choice and outcome history did play a role 
in the token gambling task.  
      To sum up, the new token-based gambling task that we developed helped us to investigate 
whether and how monkeys’ risk attitudes were modulated by different contextual factors, 
specifically whether the outcome was a gain or loss and current wealth (i.e., token assets). Next, 
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Chapter 3 
Behavior modeling of risky choices in the token-based gambling 
task 
      In the descriptive behavioral results, we found that for both monkeys their probabilities of 
choosing gamble (P(Gamble)) were influenced by multiple contextual factors, such as the 
context of gain and loss and token asset (Figure 2.5). This result, however, just indicated that 
monkeys’ choices were influenced by these individual decision-related variables (including the 
context of gain or loss, the expected value of gamble option, expected value of the sure option, 
start token number, risk (outcome variance of the option), or expected end token number, etc.). It 
remains unclear how these decision-related variables interact with each other and how the 
subjective value of each option is calculated given a specific combination of these decision-
related variables. Thus, we test a series of models to predict the risk attitude or choices of our 
subjects (two monkeys) based on various decision-related variables.   
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Model-based subjective value estimation  
      A model-based analysis requires first constructing a range of alternative models that embody 
different ways in which value could be constructed given the option attributes (here possible 
reward amounts and their respective probability). We included classical economic models 
(expected value model, expected utility model, prospect theory model), financial models (risk-
value model), optimal models that aimed to maximize the probability of getting a reward (reward 
proximity model), and models that hybrid the best model among classical economic and financial 
model with the reward proximity model. Furthermore, to find out how the wealth level 
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influences monkey’s risk attitude, we extended these basic models with the term of start token 
number (Token) in different ways. By fitting these wealth-dependent models to monkey’s choice 
behavior, we can better know how the monetary assets modulate monkeys’ behavior in a 
cognitive framework.  
3.1.1.1 Expected value model   
      The Expected value (EV) model computes the value of each option by simply calculating the 
product of attributes of options:  
𝐸𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑛 × 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛 + 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 × (1 − 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛) 
𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = (𝑥 ) × (1) 
where x is the reward outcome (in units of gaining or losing token numbers) and p is the 
objective probability of receiving the corresponding outcome.  
      The expected value difference between the two options is then transformed into choice 





where 𝛥𝐸𝑉 =  𝐸𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠 determines the sensitivity of choices to the 𝛥EV, and 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 
is the directional bias of choosing gamble. 
      This model assumes the subjects are risk-neutral since they should have no preference when 
facing a risky option and a certain option with an identical expected value. Thus, the behavioral 
results that monkeys showed specific risk attitudes when facing a gamble and a sure option in 
different contexts can only be attributed to the two free parameters s and bias.  
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3.1.1.2 Expected utility model 
      Next, we tested the expected utility (EU) model that describes risk-attitude by a non-linear 
mapping between objective value (expected value) and subjective value (expected utility). The 
EU model describes the risk attitude of the subject mainly by the coefficient of the utility 
function (α).  The utility function is in a form of power function that  
𝑢(𝑥) =  𝑥𝛼 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 0 
in which x is the objective value of an option outcome, u is the utility of x, and α is the 
coefficient of the utility function. The α indicates not only the curvature of the utility function 
but also reflects the subject’s risk attitude.  
      However, the traditional EU model only considers the utility function in gain context. To 
extend the utility function to the loss context, we test 2 different forms of the loss utility function: 
1. 𝑢(𝑥) = (−𝑥)𝛼, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0 
in which the utility function in loss share the same α with utility function in gain, so that the 
utility functions in gain and loss two curves symmetrical to the zero point ([0,0]).  
2. 𝑢(𝑥) = −𝜆(− 𝑥)𝛼, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0 
in which the utility function in loss is a reflection of the utility function in gain, but with a 
modulation parameter λ. λ larger than 1 indicates losses loom larger than gains.   
      The EU is further calculated as:  
𝐸𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑥) ∗ 𝑝 
in which u(x) is the utility of x and p is the objective probability of receiving the corresponding 
outcome (x). The expected utility difference between the two options is then transformed into 
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where 𝛥𝐸𝑈 =  𝐸𝑈𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠 determines the sensitivity of choices to the ΔSV, and 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 
is the directional bias of choosing gamble. Overall, there are 4 parameters (α, λ, s, and bias) are 
included in the EU model.  
3.1.1.3 Prospect theory model 
      The prospect theory (PT) model is derived from EU theory, whereas the PT model estimates 
the subjective value of an option with not only non-linear utilities in the gain and loss contexts 
but also a non-linear mapping of outcome probability. Thus, in addition to the parameter α 
proposed by the EU model, the PT model takes more parameters that can influence an 
individual’s choice into account, including the coefficient of probability weighting function (γ), 
the coefficient that modulates the utility function in the loss context (λ), the response bias term of 
choice function (b), and the slope term of choice function (s).  
      The subjective utility is parameterized as: 
𝑢(𝑥) = {
𝑥𝛼 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛼,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0
 
where α is a free parameter determining the curvature of the utility function, u(x), and x is the 
reward outcome (in units of gaining or losing token numbers). The utility function in loss is 
modulated by a parameter λ in the original PT model. 
 
 59  
 
      The subjective probability of each option is computed by:  
𝑤(𝑝) =  
𝑝𝛾
(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1/𝑟
 
where γ is a free parameter determining the curvature of the probability weighting function, 
w(p), and p is the objective probability of receiving the corresponding outcome. U (x) and w(p) 
were followed with research(Juechems et al., 2017; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979).  
      The subjective value (SV, or say expected utility) of each option is computed by combining 
the output of u(x) and w(p) that map objective gains and losses relative to the reference point and 
objective probability onto subjective quantities, respectively:    
𝑆𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑢( 𝑥win ) × 𝑤( 𝑝win ) + 𝑢(𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) × 𝑤( 1 − 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛) 
𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑢(𝑥 ) × 𝑤(1) 
      The subjective value difference between the two options is then transformed into choice 





where 𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝑆𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠 determines the sensitivity of choices to the ΔSV, and 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 
is the directional bias of choosing gamble. Overall, there are 5 parameters (α, λ, γ, s, and bias) 
included in the PT model.  
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Wealth-dependent models for expected value, expected utility, and prospect theory model  
      To know how token asset modulates monkey’s choice in these models, we estimated 
corresponding parameters of EV, EU, and PT models for each start token number independently. 
In addition, we examined alternative wealth-dependent models by adding a Token term to the 
original PT model in different ways. We tested the wealth-dependent models in which the 
specific parameter P was modulated by the Token in the form: 
𝑃′ = 𝑃 + 𝜃 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 
where P could be α, λ, γ, b, or s. Overall, there are 6 parameters (α, λ, γ, s, bias, and θ) included 
in the wealth-dependent PT model.  
3.1.1.4 Risk-value model 
      The risk-value model is derived from financial theory and decomposes the subjective value 
of each option into a weighted linear combination of Risk and Value. The Value was computed 
as the expected value (EV) of the option and the Risk was either computed as the variance (Var) 
of the gamble outcomes. 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 =(𝑥𝑤𝑖𝑛 − 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) (√𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛 (1 − 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛 )) 
with xwin denoting the potential winning token number, xloss denoting the losing token number,  
pwin denoting the winning probability, ploss and denoting the losing probability. 
      Comparing to the EU and PT model describes the risk attitude of the subject mainly by the 
coefficient of the utility function (α), the risk-value model attributes the risk attitude of the 
subject to the Risk-related term (Var). To know whether the difference of monkeys’ risk attitudes 
in terms of gain and loss can be explained by the risk-value model, we modeled monkeys’ 
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behaviors in gain and loss trials independently. Besides, we tested whether the risk-value model 
outperforms models using only the EV or the Var term to know whether the subjects made 
choices depending only on the Value, Risk, or both of options.  
      In these models, the subjective value difference between the two options is transformed into 





      The subjective value of each option is computed by:  
𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝜇0 +  𝜇1(𝛥𝐸𝑉) 
                                                     Or       𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝜇0 +  𝜇1(𝛥𝑉𝑎𝑟) 
                                                     Or       𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝜇0 +  𝜇1(𝛥𝐸𝑉) +  𝜇2(𝛥𝑉𝑎𝑟) 
where 𝛥𝐸𝑉 =  𝐸𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝐸𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒,  𝛥𝑉𝑎𝑟 =  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝜇i is the coefficient for each 
variable.  
Wealth-dependent risk-value model  
      Furthermore, to extend this model to describe how the token asset influences monkey’s 
choice, we add the term Token, which is the start token number of each trial to the original risk-
value model. Thus, the subjective value of each option was modeled as a weighted linear 
combination of ΔEV, ΔVar, and Token:  
𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝛥𝐸𝑉) +  𝛼2(𝛥𝑉𝑎𝑟) + 𝛼3(𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛)  
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      To ensure coefficients of variables within a model are comparable, ΔEV and ΔVar are 
normalized in the range of [-1,1] and Token is normalized in the range of [0,1]. Overall, there are 
4 parameters (𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3, and bias/ 𝜇0) included in the full risk-value model. 
3.1.1.5 Reward proximity model 
      In contrast to the EV, EU, PT, and risk-value models that assume monkey estimated 
subjective values (SVs) of options in a relative framework, the reward proximity (RP) model 
assumes monkeys estimated SVs of options closer to an absolute framework. In the relative 
framework, monkeys were supposed to be sensitive to the number of the token at the start of the 
trial (i.e. the reference point) as well as the “relative outcome” (a gain or a loss relative to the 
reference point) of option. Yet in the absolute framework, monkeys were supposed to be only 
sensitive to the expected end token number after choosing a given option, because the expected 
end token number directly indicated the probability of earning a reward in the near future. Thus, 
a monkey should be more likely to choose a sure option [+1] than a gamble option [+3,0; 
75%,25%] when the start token number is equal to 5 since the probabilities of getting a reward 
after choosing the sure option and gamble option are 1 and 0.75, respectively.  
      This model uses the probability of getting a reward (P(Reward)) as the unit of subjective 
value estimation. Thus, the subjective value of each option is defined as the probability of getting 
a reward when choosing the given option under a specific token number: 
𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑|𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛) 
      The SV of each option can be looked out in Table3.1 when the option and start token number 
are known.  
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Table 3.1. Probability of getting a reward when choosing the specific option with given start 
token asset.   
 
 
       
The subjective value difference between the two options is then transformed into choice 





where 𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝑆𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠 determines the sensitivity of choices to the ΔSV, and 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 
is the directional bias of choosing gamble. Since the reward proximity model takes both the start 
token number and the token can gain/loss when choosing a specific option into account, it is 
naturally a wealth-dependent model and includes only two free parameters s and bias. 
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3.1.1.6 Hybrid models 
      To examine whether monkeys can use multiple processes to make the decision, we tested a 
hybrid model that combines the original PT model (wealth-independent in a relative framework) 
with the reward proximity model (wealth-dependent in an absolute framework). The subjective 
value of each option is a linear combination of SV estimated by PT and SV estimated by RP 
model:   
𝑆𝑉𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑇 = 𝑢( 𝑥win ) × 𝑤( 𝑝win ) + 𝑢(𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) × 𝑤( 1 − 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛) 
𝑆𝑉𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑃 = 𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑|𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛) 
𝑆𝑉𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝜔(𝑆𝑉 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑇) + (1 − 𝜔)(𝑆𝑉 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑃) 
where u(x) and w(p) are the subjective mappings of x and p, and ω indicates the weightings of 
two-component models.  
      The subjective value difference between the two options is again transformed into choice 





where 𝛥𝑆𝑉 =  𝑆𝑉𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 𝑆𝑉𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠 determines the sensitivity of choices to the ΔSV, and 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 
is the directional bias of choosing gamble. Overall, there are 6 parameters (α, λ or β, γ, s, bias, 
and ω) included in this hybrid model.     
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3.1.3 Model comparison  
3.1.3.1 Negative log likelihoods, AIC, BIC, and cross-validation  
      We optimized model parameters by minimizing the negative log likelihoods (-LL) of the data 
given different parameters setting using Matlab’s fmincon function, initialized at multiple 
starting points of the parameter space as follows:  
0 < 𝛼, 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝛾 < 5 
−10 < 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 < 10 
0 < 𝑠 < 20 
−10 < 𝜇 < 10 
0 < 𝜔 < 1 
      There are parameters (1) slope and bias in EV model, (2) α, λ (or β), slope, and bias in EU 
model, (3) α, λ (or β), γ, slope, and bias in PT model, (4)  α, λ (or β), γ, slope, bias, and θ in 
wealth-dependent PT models, (5) 𝜇0, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3, and slope in wealth-dependent risk-value 
models, (6) slope and bias in reward proximity model, and (7) α, λ (or β), γ, slope, bias, and ω in 
the hybrid PT and RP model. Negative log-likelihoods were used to compute classical model 
selection criteria.  
      With data combined all trials across different experiment sessions form each monkey 
(Monkey G, 37 session, 23323 trials; Monkey O, 37 sessions, 19932 trials), we computed the 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC),  
AIC = 2 k + 2(−LL)  
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and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC),  
BIC = k(log (n)) + 2(−LL)  
where –LL is the negative log-likelihood (-LL) of the model, n is the number of trials used for 
the modeling, k is the number of free parameters to be estimated.  
      In addition, we also performed a five-fold cross-validation method for each model. During 
cross-validation, we randomly divided all trials into 80% training set and 20% testing set. We 
used a training set to optimize the parameters for a given model, and use the testing set to 
calculate -LL to evaluate the model.  
3.1.3.2 Model simulations  
      Next, we examined the generative performance by running the model simulation of the data 
after the optimized model’s parameters.  Model estimates of choice probability were generated 
trial-by-trial using the best-estimated parameters and then compared with the actual choices. The 
accuracy of the best model was calculated by finding the matching rate between model-predicted 
choices and empirical choices.    
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3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Model comparison  
Prospect theory model 
      Among the classical economic models (wealth-independent EV, EU, and PT model), we 
found that the PT model had the best fit for monkeys’ behaviors (comparison of -LL from cross-
validation in Table 3.2). This wealth-independent PT model still outperformed EV and EU 
models when adding a penalty term for the greater complexity of the model (AIC and BIC in 
Table 3.2). The optimized parameters for this best model were plotted in Figure 3.1 (details of 
parameters for all models were list in Table3.3).  
      As in classical expected value theory in economics (Lattimore et al., 1992), a convex utility 
function (𝛼 > 1) implies risk seeking, because in this scenario, the subject values large reward 
amounts disproportionally more than small reward amounts. Gain from winning the gamble thus 
has a stronger influence on choice than the loss from losing the gamble. In the same way, a 
concave utility function (𝛼 <  1) implies risk-seeking because large reward amounts are valued 
disproportionally less than small ones. The 𝜆 can further influence the subject’s risk-attitude in 
the context of gain or loss because it modulates the curvature of the utility function in the loss 
context. With a 𝜆 > 1, the utility function in the loss context will be steeper than that in the gain 
context, indicating the subject is more sensitive to the value change in the loss context. 
Alternatively, with a 𝜆 < 1, the utility function in the loss context will be flatter than that in the 
gain context, indicating the subject is less sensitive to the value change in the loss context. We 
found that for both monkeys, the best-fitting utility functions in the gain context were convex 
(Figure 3.1; 1-tailed t-test, H1: α >1; monkey G: α = 1.33, p < 10-4; monkey O:  α = 1.38, p < 10-
4), indicating that both monkeys were risk-seeking in the gain context. Also, the utility functions 
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in the loss context were steeper than the one in the gain context (Figure 3.1; 1-tailed t-test, H1: λ 
>1; monkey G: λ = 3.16, p < 10-4; monkey O:  λ = 1.04, p < 10-3), indicating that subjectively 
losses loom larger than gains for both monkeys.  
      In addition, a non-linear weighting of probabilities can also influence risk attitude. For 
example, an S-shaped probability weighting function ( 𝛾 <  1 ) implies that the subject 
overweighs small probabilities and underweights large probabilities. This would lead to a higher 
willingness to accept a risky gamble because small probabilities to win large amounts would be 
overweighed relative to high probabilities to win moderate amounts. We found that both 
monkeys significantly over-weighted low probabilities and under-weighted high probabilities 
(Figure 3.1; 1-tailed t-test, H1: γ <1; monkey G: γ = 0.55, p < 10-4; monkey O: γ = 0.74, p < 10-
4). Therefore, the monkeys were attracted disproportionally to large reward amounts and 
overestimated the likelihood of obtaining them when the winning probability was low, again 
leading to risk-seeking behavior.    
      Moreover, the bias term in the softmax function can also influence the frequency of a 
subject’s risky choices independent of the subjective value of the options. A negative bias will 
result in risk-seeking behavior because the subject tends to choose the gamble option, even if the 
SVs of gamble and sure option are identical. On the other hand, a positive bias will result in risk-
averse behavior. We found strong evidence for negative bias in favor of gamble options (Figure 
3.1; 1-tailed t-test, H1: bias <0; monkey G: bias = -1.13, p < 10-4; monkey O: bias = -1.35, p < 
10-4). It suggested the monkeys had a strong preference for the risky options independent of  the 
specific reward amount and outcome probability associated with the options.  
     Finally, we found that several wealth-dependent PT models outperformed the best-fitting PT 
model without the Token term (model comparison in Table 3.2). This indicated that the effect of 
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token assets on the monkeys’ choice behavior was so strong that it required a model that 
explicitly incorporate it, such as wealth-dependent PT models, to best describe behavior despite 
the increase in model complexity. Across all wealth-dependent models, the effect of token assets 
was best explained by updating the α term in the utility function as a function of the token assets 
at the start of each trial. However, a wealth-dependent model in which α was modulated linearly 
proportional to the start token number resulted in some extreme estimates. We therefore also 
fitted a wealth-dependent model independently for trials with different start token numbers the 
estimated parameters in this model (marked in blue in Table 3.3) were less extreme. The better 
results for the independent fits suggest that the modulation by token assets might be non-linear 
and disproportional across the range of token assets. 
      To examine how each parameter was modulated by current token numbers, we plotted the 
estimated parameters (listed in Table 3.4) in Figure 3.2. First, we found that both monkeys were 
risk-seeking (α > 1) when the start token number was low, but they became risk-neutral or risk-
averse when the start token number increased (Figure 3.2; light to dark green lines indicate 
increasing start token number). The estimated α was negatively modulated by the start token 
number (regression analysis; Monkey G, β = -0.16, p<10-4; Monkey O, β = -0.14, p<10-4). 
Second, there was no significant difference for the estimated λ across different start token 
numbers for either monkey (regression analysis; Monkey G, β = 0.03, p = 0.69; Monkey O, β = 
0.01, p=0.4). Third, the S-shaped weighting of probabilities was slightly influenced by increasing 
start token numbers in one monkey (light blue to dark blue lines; regression analysis; Monkey G, 
β = 0.02, p<10-4), but not at all in the other one (Monkey O, β = 0.0004, p = 0.89). Forth, the 
monkeys showed a consistent tendency to choose the gamble option independent of specific 
option attributes (Figure 3.1; the negative bias of the choice function; t-test: both monkeys, 
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p<10-4 for all start token numbers). This tendency decreased when the start token number 
increased (Figure 3.2; light gray to black lines; regression analysis; Monkey G, β = 0.32, p<10-4; 
Monkey O, β = 0.28, p<10-4), indicating monkeys became less risk-seeking as their wealth levels 
increased. Finally, the choice functions became steeper, that is monkeys’ choices became less 
stochastic when the start token number increased for both monkeys (regression analysis; Monkey 
G, β = 0.23, p<10-4; Monkey O, β = 0.22, p<10-4). This result, combined with the token effect on 
response time, indicates that choices became slower but less stochastic when token assets 
increased, which suggests a speed-accuracy tradeoff.  
      Thus, the effect of the token asset on monkeys’ risk attitude was primarily explained by 
modulation of the utility curvature that was shared in both of the gain (u(x) = xα) and loss (u(x) = 
-λ(-x)α) context, as well as the bias and slope term of choice function. Overall, the wealth-
dependent PT model well described the behavioral results that monkeys were risk-seeking in 
both gain and loss context, more risk-seeking in the gain than in the loss context, and became 
more risk-averse the more token assets they had accumulated.  
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Figure 3.1. Modeling results for PT model that best-explained monkeys’ behaviors among all 
wealth-independent models. The estimated parameters are estimated by models include data 
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Figure 3.2. Modeling results for PT model that best-explained monkeys’ behaviors among all 
wealth-dependent models. The estimated parameters are estimated by models include data from 
all combined sessions (list in Table 3.3). The color gradient indicates parameters for trials with 
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Reward proximity model and hybrid model   
      We found the reward proximity provided a worse description of the monkeys’ behavior than 
the best wealth-dependent PT model, as well as other models in the relative framework AIC, BIC, 
and -LL from cross-validation in Table 3.2). It implied that monkeys’ behaviors were better 
described in a relative framework that takes both the starting point and relative gains and losses 
into account rather than an absolute framework, in which the monkey is assumed to only care 
about the end state of each choice.  
      Furthermore, the behavioral fit did not significantly improve even when we constructed a 
hybrid of the reward proximity model with the original wealth-independent PT model (AIC, BIC, 
and -LL from cross-validation in Table 3.2). This finding suggested that the effect of token 
assets on choice behavior is better explained by a wealth-dependent PT model in a relative 
framework than a wealth-dependent reward proximity model in an absolute framework. This 
provided additional strong support that the value estimation of the monkeys relied fundamentally 
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Table 3.2. Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information (BIC), and negative log-
likelihood (-LL) for different models. AIC and BIC values are computed with all combined 
sessions for each monkey. –2*LL values are computed using five-fold cross-validation for each 
monkey. The wealth-dependent prospect theory model is the best model (blue) with the lowest 
AIC, BIC, and -2*LL values. The parameter in red indicates the parameter is modulated by the 
start token number (with parameter θ).  
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Table 3.3. The best-fit parameters for different models. The parameters are estimated by models 
include data from all combined sessions. The wealth-dependent prospect theory model that 
updates α with start token number is the best model (blue) with the lowest AIC, BIC, and -2*LL 
values (Table 3.2). The parameter in red indicates the parameter is modulated by the start token 
number (with parameter θ).  
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Risk-value model 
      The risk-value model is another classic economic model that is complementary to utility-
based models, such as prospect theory. In the risk-value model, the subjective value of each 
option is a weighted linear combination of EV and variance (Var) of gamble outcome (as well as 
Token in the extended wealth-dependent model), which allows estimating the relative 
importance of different behavioral factors on choice behavior. We found that the wealth-
dependent risk-value model best-described monkeys’ behavior (AIC and BIC, and -LL from 
cross-validation in Table 3.2). The parameters of the best-fitting model are shown in Figure 3.3. 
      First, the monkeys behaved rationally and preferred the option with the higher EV in both 
gain and loss context (Figure 3.3; t-test, H1: βΔEV ≠ 0; monkey G: βΔEV gain = 5.30, βΔEV loss = 
14.64, both p < 10-4; monkey O: βΔEV gain = 5.99, βΔEV loss = 7.47, both p < 10-4). Interestingly, the 
effect of EV difference on choice was significantly (or near significantly) stronger in the loss 
context than that in the gain context (Figure 3.3; paired t-test, H1: ΔβΔEV (βΔEV gain - βΔEV loss) ≠ 0; 
monkey G: ΔβΔEV = -9.33, p < 10-4; monkey O: ΔβΔEV = -1.48, p = 0.0505). 
      Second, we found that the coefficient of the risk term (ΔVar) was significantly negative for 
one monkey in both the gain and loss context (Figure 3.3; t-test, H1: βΔVar ≠ 0; monkey G: βΔVar 
gain = -0.55, βΔVar loss = -3.60, both p < 10-4); while significantly positive in the gain context and 
negative in the loss context for another monkey (Figure 3.3; t-test, H1: βΔVar ≠ 0; monkey O: 
βΔVar gain = 0.24, βΔVar loss = -1.76, both p < 10-3).  This suggested that monkeys were risk-averse. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the risk term were significantly more negative for losses than for 
gains for both monkeys (Figure 3.3; paired t-test, H1: ΔβΔVar (βΔVar gain - βΔVar loss )  ≠ 0; monkey 
G: ΔβΔVar = 3.05, p < 10-4; monkey O: ΔβΔVar = 2.01, p < 10-4). This suggests a loss-aversion 
effect.  
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      Third, the response bias terms were significantly positive in the gain and loss context for both 
monkeys (Figure 3.3; t-test, H1: βBias ≠ 0; monkey G: βBias gain = 1.70, p < 10-4, βBias loss = 0.09,  p 
= 0.32; monkey O: βBias gain = 2.47,  βBias loss = 0.77,  both p < 10-4) i.e. the monkeys preferred the 
gamble option regardless of the option attributes (such as EV and risk), leading to risk-seeking 
behavior in the gain context. This “Bias effect” was stronger than the “Risk effect” so that 
monkeys exhibited an overall risk-seeking rather than a risk-averse behavior.  
      Finally, we found that the monkeys preferred the gamble option less for increasing token 
assets in the gain context (Figure 3.3; t-test, H1: βToken ≠ 0; monkey G: β Token gain = -1.80, p < 10-
4; monkey O: β Token gain = -1.48, p < 10-4), but more (or equally) preferred the gamble for 
increasing token asset  in the loss context (Figure 3.3; t-test, H1: : βToken ≠ 0; monkey G: : βToken 
loss = 1.68, p < 10-4; monkey O: : βToken loss = 0.12, p = 0.46). This differential effect of token 
assets in the gain and loss context was significantly (Figure 3.3; paired t-test, H1: Δ βToken (βToken 
gain - βToken loss )  ≠ 0; monkey G: Δ βToken = -3.47, p < 10-4; monkey O: Δ βToken = -1.60, p < 10-4). 
These results indicated the token assets had the opposite effect on the monkey’s risk attitude in 
the gain and loss context.  Compared with the other effects, the effect of token assets on choice 
behavior was weak but consistent with empirical monkeys’ behaviors.  
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Figure 3.3. Coefficients in wealth-dependent risk-value model modeling for gain and loss trials. 
**** denotes p < 10-4; ns denotes not significant.  
 
3.2.2 Simulation results 
      To characterize how well our models predicted the contextual effects on risk attitude, we 
compared the predictions of the model with real behavior. We generated for each trial t the 
probability of choosing the gamble option according to the best-fitting model. For the best model 
(i.e. the wealth-dependent PT that estimated parameter for trials with different start token 
number independently), we calculated the accuracy by finding the matching rate between the 
model-estimated choices and actual choices (Monkey G: 0.89 for all trials; Monkey O: 0.82 for 
all trials).  
      Then we submitted the model-estimated choice probabilities to the same statistical analyses 
showed in Figure 2.5 for the actual behavior. The model’s estimated a probability higher than 
0.5 to choose the gamble in both the gain and loss context (Figure 3.4 left). Moreover, the 
model-derived gamble choice probabilities were higher in the gain than that in the loss context 
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(Figure 3.4left). Finally, as the start token number increased, the choice probabilities predicted 
by the model decreased in the gain context and increased in the loss context (Figure 3.4 right). 
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3.3 Discussion  
      In sum, by comparing a range of variants of the prospect theory (PT) model, risk-value (RV) 
model, and reward proximity (RP) model, we found the wealth-dependent PT model best 
described the monkeys’ behavioral data. The model-simulated choices showed the same 
contextual effects as found in the empirical data (Figure 3.3). Thus, the task developed in this 
study using monkeys generates behavior during decisions under risk that are similar to the one 
shown in humans. Thus, this task allowed us to investigate in the primate brain the neuronal 
computations of functional components of value estimation and representation postulated by 
prospect theory. 
3.3.1 Constraints of current models and alternative model for the future direction  
      The wealth-dependent PT model, in which α was modulated by start token number, best-
described monkeys’ behavior. However, when we modeled behavior for each start token number 
independently, we found that most parameters in the original PT model (not only α, but also γ, 
slope, and bias) were influenced by the start token number (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4). This 
indicates that token assets can influence monkeys’ risk-attitude in multiple ways. A more 
comprehensive examination of models with different parameter combinations that are influenced 
by token numbers may a good step in better understanding how the current wealth level 
influences monkeys’ risky behaviors.  
       Moreover, one of the characteristics of this task was that the monkeys had to accumulate the 
necessary tokens (≥6) to receive a standard fluid reward (600μl water) over multiple trials 
(Figure 2.3). Therefore, models that take the past or future trials into account may provide a 
more natural description of behaviors in this task. For example, the reward proximity model, 
specifically fell short of predicting choice behaviors in the loss context because no matter what 
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the current token asset and the presented options are, the probability of getting a reward is 
always zero. Thus, it was not surprising that the fit of this model was much worse than of the 
other models. In the future, it might be interesting to extend the reward proximity model with 
variables that take future rewards (with specific weights) into account. Doing so might make this 























Neuronal correlates of decision-related variables in the anterior 
insular cortex 
      In the behavioral results, we found that macaques, like humans, change their risk attitude 
across wealth levels and gain/loss contexts. On the other hand, by constructing a series of 
behavioral models, we found the prospect theory model well-described monkeys’ behaviors. 
Thus, to further investigated whether neurons in the anterior insular cortex (AIC) encoded the 
‘reference point’ (i.e. the current wealth level of the monkey) and the ‘loss aversion effect’ (i.e. 
losses loom larger than gains) as postulated by prospect theory, we did single-unit recordings in 
the AIC. We first examined whether there were neuronal correlates in the AIC reflecting 
contextual factors including current token asset, the context of gain/loss, and the expected value 
of the option. Then we examined whether the neurons encoding value signals in context gain and 
loss in an asymmetrical manner. Finally, we checked whether changes in the activity of AIC 
neurons were correlated with the inter-trial fluctuations in choice and risk attitude.    
4.1 Methods  
4.1.1 Cortical localization and estimation of recording locations 
      We used T1 and T2 magnetic resonance images (MRIs) obtained for the monkey (3.0 T) to 
determine the location of the anterior insula. In primates, the insular cortex constitutes a separate 
cortical lobe, located on the lateral aspect of the forebrain, in the depth of the Sylvian or lateral 
fissure (LF)(Evrard, 2019; Reil, 1809) (Figure 4.1). It is adjoined anteriorly by the orbital 
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prefrontal cortex, and it is covered dorsally by the frontoparietal operculum and ventrally by the 
temporal operculum. The excision of the two opercula and part of the orbital prefrontal cortex 
reveals the insula proper, delimited by the anterior, superior, and inferior peri-insular (or limiting 
or circular) sulci. We used the known stereoscopic recording chamber location and recording 
depth of the electrode to estimate the location of each recorded neuron. The estimated recording 
locations were superimposed on the MRI scans of each monkey. Cortical areas were estimated 
using the second updated version of the macaque monkey brain atlas by Saleem and Logothetis 
(Reveley et al., 2017) with a web-based brain atlas(Bakker et al., 2015). 
4.1.2 Surgical procedures and single-unit recording 
      Each animal was surgically implanted with a titanium head post and a hexagonal titanium 
recording chamber (29mm in diameter) 20.5 mm (Monkey G) and 16 mm (Monkey O) lateral to 
the midline, and 30 mm (Monkey G) and 34.5 mm (Monkey O) anterior of the interaural line. A 
craniotomy was then performed in the chambers on each animal, allowing access to the AIC. All 
sterile surgeries were performed under anesthesia. Post-surgical pain was controlled with an 
opiate analgesic (buprenex; 0.01 mg/kg IM), administered twice daily for 5 days postoperatively.  
      Single neuron activities were recorded extracellularly with single tungsten microelectrodes 
(impedance of 2-4 MΩs, Frederick Haer, Bowdoinham, ME). Electrodes were inserted through a 
guide tube positioned just above the surface of the dura mater and were lowered into the cortex 
under control of a self-built microdrive system. The electrodes penetrated perpendicular to the 
surface of the cortex. The depths of the neurons were estimated by their recording locations 
relative to the surface of the cortex. Electrophysiological data were collected using the TDT 
system (Tucker & Davis). Action potentials were amplified, filtered, and discriminated 
conventionally with a time-amplitude window discriminator. Spikes were isolated online if the 
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amplitude of the action potential was sufficiently above a background threshold to reliably 
trigger a time-amplitude window discriminator and the waveform of the action potential was 
invariant and sustained throughout the experimental recording. Spikes were then identified using 
principal component analysis (PCA) and the timestamps were collected at a sampling rate of 
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Figure 4.1. Recording sites with the location of neurons of different functional types.  
Coronal MRI sections for each monkey show the locations of recorded neurons. The right side of 
each section shows the MRI from the anatomical scan of each monkey performed before surgery. 
Superimposed on each section is the estimated location of each recorded neuron based on 
penetration coordinates and recording depth. Neuronal classification according to the regression 
model is marked in different colors. The dot size indicates the number of units recorded in the 
location. Different colors indicate different functional signals encoded by the neurons. The 
position of each section in stereotactic coordinates is indicated on top. The left side of each 
section shows the most similar section in the macaque brain atlas of Saleem and Logothetis 
(2012). The location of the agranular and dysgranular insula (filled pink area), and gustatory 
















 87  
 
4.1.3 Spike density function  
      To represent neural activity as a continuous function, we calculated spike density functions 
by convolving the peri-stimulus time histogram with a growth-decay exponential function that 
resembled a postsynaptic potential(Hanes et al., 1998). Each spike, therefore, exerts influence 
only forward in time. The equation describes rate (R) as a function of time (t): R(t) = (1 - exp(-
t/τg))∗exp(-t/τd), where τg is the time constant for the growth phase of the potential and τd is the 
time constant for the decay phase. Based on physiological data from excitatory synapses, we 
used 1 ms for the value of τg and 20 ms for the value of τd (Sayer et al., 1990). 
4.1.4 Linear regression analysis of neuronal coding  
      To find AIC neurons whose activity reflects specific decision-related variable(s), we 
performed linear regression with mean firing rate (FR) within the choice period for each trial as 
the dependent variable, and a predictor derived from the decision-related variables as the 
independent variable:  
𝐹𝑅 =  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼 ∗  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟   
in which α was the coefficient of the predictor. A constant term was added as a baseline model.   
To tested four different classes of decision-related variables: (1) “Token-asset” variables, (2) 
“Gain/Loss-Value” variables, (3) “Risk” variables, and (4) an “Absolute value” variable. In total, 
we considered 16 different potential decision-related variables, as well as a baseline model that 
consisted only of a constant term.  
      Token-asset variables were variables that represented the start token number in one of three 
different types. The first type, the linear token signal, encoded the start token number in a linear, 
continuous manner (monotonically rising or falling from 0 to 5). The second type, the binary 
token signal, encoded the start token number in a binary, discontinuous manner (with a value of 
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“1” for trials with start token number 0 to 3 and a value of “2” for trials with start token number 
3-5). The third type, the tuned token signal, encoded the start token number with a peak in 
activity at one of the token numbers from 0 to 5, and the activity symmetrically falling for token 
numbers that were smaller or larger than the peak.  
      Gain/Loss-Value variables were variables that represented the gain/loss context, the expected 
value of options, or gain/loss context-dependent value signals. We tested five types of variables. 
The first type, the gain/loss signal, encoded the context of gain or loss in a binary manner. Trials 
in the gain domain were indicated with a “1”, and trials in the loss domain with a “-1”. The only 
exception was no-choice trials with a sure option with EV = 0, which were indicated with a “0”. 
The second type, the linear value signal, encoded the expected value of options in a linear, 
continuous manner across both the gain and loss domain (with a range from -3 to 3). The 
remaining types also encoded the expected value of options, but contingent on the gain/loss 
context. The third type, the gain value signal, encoded the expected value of options in a linear 
manner, but only in the gain domain (options with EV larger than 0 were encoded as the original 
number, otherwise were encoded as “0”), while the fourth type, the loss value signal, encoded 
the expected value of options in a linear manner only in the loss domain (options with EV 
smaller than 0 were encoded as the original number, otherwise were encoded as “0”). The fifth 
type, the behavioral salience signal, encoded the expected value of options in a linear but 
asymmetric direction for the gain and loss domain. Thus, this signal encoded the absolute 
distance of the value from zero, independent of whether it represented a gain or a loss (e.g. both 
an option with EV = 1.5 and an option with EV = -1.5 would be encoded as “1.5”).  
      Risk variables were variables that represented the variance of possible outcomes of an option 
(calculated by √𝑝(1 − 𝑝), in which p was the winning probability of the option). We considered 
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two different types. The first type, the linear risk signal, encoded the variance of outcome in a 
linear manner proportional to the variance. The second type, the binary risk signal, encoded 
whether the outcome of the option was uncertain or not in a binary manner (with a value of “1” 
for all gamble options and a value of “0” for all sure options).  
      So far, value always was defined as a relative change of tokens, independent of the start 
token number. We also considered an absolute value signal (i.e., the sum of all possible end 
token numbers, weight by their probability). This signal took into account not only the possible 
change in token number but also the start token number. Thus, it represented the outcome of a 
choice in an absolute framework that reflected how close the monkey was to earning the fluid 
reward. 
Mixed-selective neuronal coding with regression analysis 
      The regression analysis using the series of single-variable models indicated that many 
neurons encoded multiple decision-related variables. We therefore further investigated the 
contribution of decision-related variables to neural activity, by using multiple linear regression 
with the mean firing rate (FR) within the choice period for each trial as the dependent variable, 
and predictors derived from the decision-related variables as the independent variables.  
𝐹𝑅 =  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼1 ∗  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1   + . . . . . . + 𝛼𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖 
We fitted a family of regression models with all possible combinations of the basic decision-
related variables described in the last section. This resulted in a total of 163 tested models. For 
each neuron, we determined the best-fitting model using the Akaike information criterion and 
classified it as belonging to different functional categories according to the variables that were 
included in the best-fitting model.  
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4.1.5 Receiver operating criterion (ROC) analysis 
      To determine whether the neural activity of the AIC neurons was correlated with the 
monkey’s choice behavior or risk-attitude, we computed a receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) for each cell and computed the area under the curve (AUC) as a measure of the cell’s 
discrimination ability in a trial-by-trial manner. For each neuron, we first computed the AUC 
value of choice probability by comparing the distributions of firing rates associated with each of 
the two choices (i.e. choice of “gamble” or choice of “sure”). We also computed the AUC value 
of risk-seeking probability by comparing the two distributions of firing rates associated with 
risk-seeking and risk-avoidance behavior. Risk-seeking trials were defined as trials where the 
monkey chose the gamble even though the expected value of the gamble option was smaller than 
the expected value of the sure option. We did not include trials in which the monkey chose the 
gamble option and it had a higher expected value because in that case, the monkey’s choice did 
not give any indication about his risk-attitude at that moment. Conversely, risk-avoiding trials 
were defined as trials where the monkey chose the sure option even though the expected value of 
the sure option was smaller than the expected value of the gamble option. Thus, trials used to 
compute the risk-seeking probability were a subset of the trials used to compute the choice 
probability, namely those in which the monkeys did not make choices that maximized the 
expected value of the chosen option. 
4.2 Results  
4.2.1 Anterior Insular neurons encode decision-related variables that affect  risk-attitude  
      To determine the neuronal basis underlying prospect theory, we recorded 240 neurons in the 
AIC of two macaque monkeys (monkey G: 142 neurons; monkey O: 98 neurons) working in the 
token gambling task. The recording locations are shown in Figure 4.2a (more details in Figure 
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4.1). We analyzed the neuronal activity in the choice period (i.e., the time from target onset to 
saccade initiation) to determine if AIC neurons carried signals that could influence decision 
making. We began by analyzing activity during no-choice trials, in which only one option was 
presented. In general, the AIC neurons showed weak spatial selectivity. Only 7% (17/240) of all 
AIC neurons showed a significant effect of spatial location on neuronal activity (1-way ANOVA, 
p<0.05). We therefore ignored spatial target configuration for the remaining analysis.    
      To quantitatively characterize the variables that each AIC neuron encodes during the choice 
period, we examined the activity of each neuron using a series of linear regression models with 
all potential combinations of 3 basic variables (token assets, value, and risk) and a baseline term. 
This resulted in 8 families of models. Within each family, a basic variable could be represented 
by varying numbers of specific instantiations (3 forms of token-encoding, 5 forms of value-
encoding, 2 forms of risk-encoding). This resulted in a total of 162 tested models, including a 
model that included only a baseline term (for details see Methods). For each neuron, we 
identified the best fitting model using the Akaike information criterion and classified it into 
different functional categories according to the variables that were most likely encoded by the 
neuronal activity.              
      The vast majority of recorded AIC neuron activity (146/240; 61%) encoded at least one 
decision-related variable (task-related neurons: p < 0.05 for the coefficient of a specific variable 
in the best-fitting multiple linear regression model; Figure 4.2b, more details in Table 4.1).      
Among these task-related neurons, 78 neurons (33%) carried gain/loss-modulated value signals, 
109 neurons (45%) carried token signals, 19 neurons (8%) carried risk signals, and 9 neurons 
(4%) carried an absolute value signal. A substantial number of AIC neurons (53/146; 36%) 
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showed mixed selectivity and encoded more than one decision-related variable. The distributions 
of neural type classification were similar across the two monkeys (Table 4.2). 
      A large group of AIC neurons reflected information about the expected value of the options 
(value-encoding neurons). A subset of this group of AIC neurons, carrying a Linear value signal 
(example neuron in Figure 4.2c), encoded the expected value of all options in a monotonically 
rising (n=13) or falling (n=1) fashion, for both gains and losses. This kind of value signal is not 
gain/loss context-sensitive. However, we found the neuronal activity of other subsets of value-
encoding neurons that varied largely as a function of the way they represented value across the 
Gain and the Loss context (Figure 4.2d-e). One group of these value-encoding neurons carried a 
binary Gain/Loss signal (Figure 4.2d) that categorized each option as gain or loss, regardless of 
the expected value. In addition, we found AIC neurons that represented value in both the gain 
and loss context, but with inverse correlations of neural activity and value (Figure 4.2e). These 
neurons likely carried a Behavioral salience signal. Most interestingly, we found two other 
groups of AIC neurons carrying Loss value (Figure 4.2f) or Gain value signals (Figure 4.2g), 
respectively. These neurons represented a value signal, but only in either the loss or the gain 
context. We encountered more Loss value neurons (n=29) than Gain value neurons (n=4). The 
larger number of neurons encoding Loss value fits with human neuroimaging findings that 
suggest a role for the anterior insula in encoding aversive stimuli and situations(Canessa et al., 
2013; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005).  
      The largest proportion of AIC neurons reflected information about the currently owned token 
number. These token-encoding neurons used three different frameworks for encoding token 
assets. The first group carried a Linear token signal (Figure 4.2h). These AIC neurons 
monotonically increased (n=11) or decreased (n=2) their activity with the number of token 
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assets. The second group carried a Binary token signal (Figure 4.2i). These AIC neurons 
categorized all possible token numbers into a high [3, 4, 5] and a low [0, 1, 2] token level. 
Likely, this reflects a fundamental distinction between a ‘low’ token level, for which it is 
impossible that the monkey will earn a reward at the end of the current trial (because the monkey 
can only earn a maximum of 3 tokens in one trial), and a ‘high’ token level that makes it possible 
to earn a reward in the current trial. The third, and the largest, group carried a Numerical token 
signal. These AIC neurons are number-selective and are tuned for a preferred number (here four, 
example neuron in Figure 4.2j). We used a Gaussian function to fit this activity pattern. The 
AIC neurons carrying a Numerical token signal covered the entire scale from 0-5 tokens with 
some neurons having each of the possible token amounts as their preferred number. 
      Based on human neuroimaging data (Bossaerts, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2008), it has been 
suggested that the anterior insular cortex encodes the riskiness of options. We tested therefore if 
AIC neurons encoded risk-related signals. Here risk was defined as outcome variance. We found 
some AIC neurons (n=9) carrying a Linear risk signal (Figure 4.2k) that encoded the risk of the 
various options across both the gain and loss context in a parametric fashion. We also found 
another group of AIC neurons (n=10) encoding a Binary risk signal that categorized options into 
safe or uncertain. More details of the distribution of type of neuron can be found in Table 4.2and 
Table 4.3.  
      In the analysis so far, we have used a relative framework for value. The expected value was 
defined as token changes relative to a reference point (the start token number). However, the 
value could also be defined in an absolute framework (i.e., the final token number at the end of 
the trial). Such an absolute value framework is arguably better suited for capturing the interest of 
the monkey in ascertaining how close he is to collecting 6 tokens and reaping a reward. We 
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tested for AIC neurons that represented the expected absolute value, which is the expected end 
token number weighted by the probability of each outcome. However, we found only a very 
small number (9/240; 4%) carrying an End token signal (Figure 4.2l).  
      A significant number of AIC neurons showed activity patterns that matched several 
predictions of prospect theory. First, we found that many AIC neurons encode the wealth level of 
the monkey, i.e. the token number at the start of the trial. Within the context of our task, this 
variable represented the reference point relative to which the gain or loss options are measured. 
Simultaneously, this variable also indicates the current state of progress and indicates how close 
the monkey is to achieving the next reward. Second, many other AIC neurons reflect in their 
activity whether the offer is a gain or a loss. Some of them encoded the context, i.e., whether the 
options were presented in the gain or loss context. Other neurons represented a gain/loss-specific 
value signal in a parametric manner exclusively. Third, only very few neurons encode the 
expected absolute value. Taken together, these three findings strongly imply that the primate 
AIC uses a relative value encoding framework, anchored to a reference point that reflects the 
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Figure 4.2. AIC Neurons encode diverse task-related variables in forced-choice trials. 
(a) MRI images showing the area of the recording of each monkey. Left and middle: sagittal 
(left) and coronal (middle) view of the insular cortex of monkey G. Right: coronal view of the 
insular cortex of monkey O. 
(b) Venn diagram of the neurons encoding four task-related variables in the forced-choice trials. 
Green: the expected value of the option (EV); Blue: start token number; Red: risk (variability of 
potential outcomes); Yellow: end token number. 
(c-g) Example neurons showing a variety of patterns by which the contextual information (gain 
vs. loss) and/or the EV were encoded. Upper panels: spike density function (SDF), aligned by the 
target onset (t=0). Lower panels: mean firing rate of each example neuron at different EV levels. 
The mean firing rate was calculated using the window from target onset to saccade initiation 
(varied across trials). The distribution of saccade timing was presented as a boxplot on top of 
each SDF. For clarity, when plotting the SDF, data of some EV levels were grouped together, as 
indicated by the color codes. (c) linear encoding of the EV across contexts; (d) binary encoding 
of gain/loss context; (e)  linear encoding of the absolute value of the EV in both contexts; (f) 
linear encoding of the EV in the loss context; (g) linear encoding of the EV in the gain context. 
(h-j) Example neurons showing a variety of patterns by which the token information was 
encoded. (h) linear; (i) binary encoding of the start token number; (j) encoding of a specific 
number of start token (=4). Conventions are as in (c-g). 
(k) Example neuron showing linear encoding of the risk. Conventions are as in (c-g). 
(l) Example neuron showing linear encoding of the end token number.                                              
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Table 4.1. Summary of the number and percentage of significant responding neurons in different 
subsets of neuron types for all recorded AIC neurons.  
 
Table 4.2. Summary of the number and percentage of significant responding neurons in different 
subsets of neuron types for AIC neurons recorded from each monkey.   
 
Table 4.3. Summary of the number and percentage of neurons positively or negatively correlated 
to different decision-related variables.  
 
Table 4.4. The number of each signal during the choice period in the force choice trial recounted 
based upon the AUC for choice or risk-attitude.   
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4.2.2 Value-encoding neurons in AIC exhibit contextual modulation postulated by the 
Prospect theory  
      The majority of value-encoding AIC neurons were context-modulated (Figure 4.2d-g). A 
strong assumption of Prospect theory is that changes in relative value are not encoded 
symmetrically across gains and losses. Indeed, the monkeys’ behavior indicated that they were 
more sensitive to objective value differences in the loss than the gain context (i.e. steeper utility 
functions in the loss than that in the gain context in Figure 3.1). We therefore investigated 
whether and how value signals across the AIC population showed matching differences in their 
sensitivity for gains and losses. We examined the absolute value of the standardized regression 
coefficients (SRC) of Loss-Value Neurons in the loss context and that of Gain-Value neurons in 
the gain context. At the population level, we found indeed that Loss value signals and Gain 
Value signals had different sensitivities to changes in value. Specifically, the normalized |SRC|s 
of Loss-Value Neurons in the loss context were larger than that of Gain-Value Neuron in the 
gain context (Figure 4.3a, permutation test; mean of |SRCloss|= 2.978, mean of |SRCgain|= 2.058, 
p = 0.054; unsigned SRC for losses and gains were indicated in red and green, respectively). This 
suggests that the AIC neurons encoding value signals were more sensitive to increasing loss than 
increasing gain (Figure4. 3b).  
      Moreover, the sensitivity of value change in gain or loss context was also influenced by the 
wealth level. Normalized |SRC| of Loss-Value Neurons in the loss context became smaller as the 
wealth level increased (Figure 4.3c, left; permutation test; mean of |SRCloss| in low wealth level 
= 3.49, mean of |SRCloss| with high wealth level= 2.47, p = 0.017; unsigned SRC in the loss 
context for low or high wealth levels were indicated in orange and red, respectively). Normalized 
|SRC| of Gain-Value Neurons in the gain context also became smaller as the wealth level 
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increased. However, this trend did not reach a significant level (Figure 4.3c, right; permutation 
test; mean of |SRCGain| in low wealth level = 2.38, mean of |SRCgain| in high wealth level= 2.06, p 
= 0.29; unsigned SRC in the gain context in low or high wealth levels were indicated in light and 
dark green, respectively). Again, this wealth level-sensitive effect on AIC value coding (Figure 
3d) is consistent with the fact that monkeys became less sensitive to objective value change 
when the wealth level increased (i.e., utility functions became flattered in both the loss and gain 
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Figure 4.3. Gain-Value and loss-Value neurons exhibit differential sensitivity to EV change 
in the gain and loss context. 
(a-b) Linear regression was performed using the expected value of the option (EV) as the 
regressor, to account for the variability of firing rates for Loss-Value neurons (39 neurons) in 
loss-context trials; and for Gain-Value neurons (12 neurons) in gain-context trials. See Methods 
for details of the neuron selection.  
(a) Distribution of the standardized regression coefficients (SRC). For cross-context comparison, 
the absolute values of SRCs (|SRCs|) were plotted. Left panel: data of those Loss-Value neurons 
in loss-context trials. Right panel: data of those Gain-Value neurons in gain-context trials. Each 
count represents one neuron. Inverted triangle: mean of the distribution. 
(b) Replot the SRCs (as the slope of ΔFR to ΔEV) of Loss Value neurons (red) and those of Gain 
Value neurons (green) in loss- and gain-context, respectively. Noted that the slope of the red line 
is steeper than the slope of the green line (p=0.053, permutation test), indicating that as 
compared to the Gain Value neurons, the Loss Value neurons are more sensitive to EV change 
(in the loss context), mirroring the pattern observed from behavior (Fig.1g). The solid line and 
shadow area: mean ± S.E.M. 
(c-d) Linear regression was performed using the expected value of the option (EV) as the 
regressor, to account for the variability of firing rates for Loss-Value neurons in loss-context 
trials in low or high token level; and for Gain-Value neurons in gain-context trials in low or high 
token level.  
(c) Distribution of the |SRCs| of Loss Value neurons in loss-context (left column) and |SRCs| of 
Gain Value neurons in gain-context (right column), split by start token levels. Upper row: low 
token level (start token number = 0-2; Bottom row: high token level (start token number = 3-5). 
Conventions as in (a). 
(d) Replot the SRCs from (c). Note that for both gain- and loss- contexts, the slope becomes 
shallower as the token level increases, consistent with the pattern observed from behavior 
(Fig.1g). 
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4.2.3 Choice probability of AIC neurons predict the internal states related to behavioral 
choices 
      The gain/loss-specific value signals and the wealth level signals in AIC were present before 
the choice was made and were therefore in a position to influence the monkey’s decisions. To 
determine whether the neural activity of the AIC neurons correlates with choice behavior, we 
computed a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) for each cell and then computed the area 
under the curve (AUC) as a measure of the cell’s discrimination ability. In this analysis, an AUC 
value significantly different from 0.5 indicates at least a partial discrimination between two 
conditions. For each AIC neuron, we calculated two AUC values. First, we compared the firing 
rate distributions on choice trials when the monkey chose the gamble versus the sure option. We 
used this AUC value as a measure of choice probability. Second, we compared the firing rate 
distributions on choice trials when the monkey was risk-seeking versus risk-avoiding. We used 
this AUC value as a measure of risk-attitude probability. Risk-seeking trials were defined as 
trials where the monkey chose the gamble, even when the expected value of the gamble option 
was smaller than the expected value of the sure option. We did not include trials, in which the 
monkey chose the gamble option and it had a higher expected value because in that case, the 
monkey’s choice did not give any indication about his risk-attitude at that moment. Conversely, 
risk-avoiding trials were defined as trials where the monkey chose the sure option, even so, it had 
a lower expected value than the gamble option. Thus, trials used to compute the risk-seeking 
probability were the subset of the trials used to compute the choice probability, in which the 
monkeys did not make choices that maximized the expected value of the chosen option. 
      We found that trial-by-trial fluctuations in the activity of a subset of AIC neurons (35/240; 
15%) significantly correlated with fluctuations of choice or risk-attitude. As shown in Figure 
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4.4, 19 neurons (8%) showed a significant choice probability (green), 20 neurons (8%) showed 
significant risk-attitude probability (purple), and 4 neurons (2%) showed both significant choice 
probability and risk-attitude probability (black). Across the AIC population (n=240), the ability 
of neural activity to predict choice and risk attitude showed a strong positive correlation (Pearson 
correlation; r = 0.41, p<10-4). 
      AIC neurons encode contextual information that influences monkeys’ choice and momentary 
risk-attitude, such as current wealth level, gain/loss, and the value of each option (Figure 4.2). It 
is therefore not surprising that the activity of many of these neurons is predictive of choice or 
risk-taking. To test whether neurons encoding specific behaviorally relevant variables were more 
likely to carry significant choice or risk-attitude probability signals (Figure 4.5), we used a chi-
square test, which is used to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in one or more categories. 
However, a chi-square test showed no significant dependency between the encoding of a specific 
decision-related variable and the likelihood that choice-predictive and/or risk-attitude-predictive 
signals were carried by a given AIC neuron (Table4.4, 𝛘2= 7.61, p = 0.67, excluding neurons 
with AUROC that predict neither choice nor risk-attitude).    
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of area under the curve (AUC) of receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) for choice and risk-attitude in individual neurons.  
AUC values capturing the covariation of each neuron with differences in choice (choosing 
gamble or sure) and risk-attitude (risk-seeking or risk-avoidance). Each point represents one 
neuron (n = 240), and colors indicate the significance of the two AUC values. In the marginal 
distributions, significant neurons are indicted in darker shades and the arrowheads indicate the 
average values across the entire distribution (light green or light purple) and the subset of 
neurons with significant AUC (dark green or dark purple), respectively. The gray vertical and 
horizontal dashed lines show the area of no significant discrimination ability (AUC of choice = 
0.5 and AUC of risk-attitude = 0.5). The broken line represents the linear regression relating the 
AUC of choice and AUC of risk-attitude (r and p values refer to the regression slope).   
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Figure 4.5. Distribution of area under the curve (AUC) of receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) for choice and risk-attitude in neurons encode different kinds of decision-related 
signals. 
AUC values capturing the covariation of each neuron with differences in choice (choosing 
gamble or sure) and risk-attitude (risk-seeking or risk-avoidance). Each point represents one 
neuron (n = 240). Shapes indicate the significance of the two AUC values.  Colors indicate the 
functional signal encoded by the neuron. In the marginal distributions, significant neurons are 
indicted in darker shades and the arrowheads indicate the average values across the entire 
distribution (light green or light purple) and the subset of neurons with significant AUC (dark 
green or dark purple), respectively. The gray vertical and horizontal dashed lines show the area 
of no significant discrimination ability (AUC of choice = 0.5 and AUC of risk-attitude = 0.5). 
The broken line represents the linear regression relating the AUC of choice and AUC of risk-
attitude (r and p values refer to the regression slope).  
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4.3 Discussion   
4.3.1 Involvement of anterior insular cortex in the decision making under risk   
The insular cortex is a large heterogeneous cortex that is typically divided into posterior 
granular, intermediate dysgranular, and anterior agranular sectors, based on cytoarchitectural 
differences.  Our recordings were concentrated in the most anterior part of the insula and 
encompassed mostly agranular and some dysgranular areas (Figure 4.1). In addition, we also 
recorded some neurons in the border regions of the adjacent gustatory cortex. Importantly, we 
found no functional segregation or gradient with respect to the functional signals that were 
represented across the different cortical areas, we explored. This fits with a recent primate 
neuroimaging study that showed strong activation of this entire region by visual cues indicating 
reward, as well as reward delivery (Kaskan et al., 2017). Insula has long been known to be 
strongly connected with the neighboring gustatory cortex (Ogawa, 1994; Vincis et al., 2020). 
Recently, several lines of studies have demonstrated that neurons in the gustatory cortex not only 
engage the primary processing of gustatory inputs but also involve multisensory integration 
(Craig, 2002; Craig & Craig, 2009), as well as higher cognitive functions like decision-making 
(Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Vincis et al., 2020). This suggests that the primate insular cortex and 
the neighboring gustatory cortex are strongly interconnected and form an interacting distributed 
network during decision making. 
4.3.2 Anterior insular neurons represent decision-related variables postulated by prospect 
theory 
4.3.2.1 Anterior insular neurons encode the current wealth level 
      Prospect theory assumes that people make decisions based on the potential gain or losses 
relative to a reference point. In our experiment, the natural reference point against which the 
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monkey compared possible outcomes was the current token assets. Consistent with this idea, we 
found that the activity of a substantial number of AIC neurons (109/240; 45%) encoded start 
token number. The AIC has been suggested to represent the current physiological state of the 
subject (i.e., interoception) (Craig, 2002; Craig & Craig, 2009; Critchley & Garfinkel, 2018; 
Livneh et al., 2020). Our findings suggest that AIC also encodes more abstract state variables, 
such as current wealth level, which are important for economic decisions that will influence the 
future homeostatic state. Notably, we found some AIC neurons encode the start token number on 
a numerical scale, with their activity increased (or decreased) specifically when the monkey 
owned a particular number of tokens. Such a pattern of numerical encoding has been identified in 
the primate prefrontal and parietal cortex (Nieder, 2016; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009), medial 
temporal lobe (Kutter et al., 2018), and recently in AIC (L. Wang et al., 2015). It would be 
interesting for future studies to investigate whether these number-tuned neurons relate to the 
numerical abilities of primates. 
4.3.2.2 Anterior insular neurons encode the value signal in a gain/loss-specific manner  
      Our results overwhelmingly support the notion that value-related signals in the brain operate 
in a relative framework. Only 4% of neurons in the AIC carried a value signal in an absolute 
framework. However, how the value of options is represented in a relative framework is an issue 
under debate. The core of the debate regards whether the value of gains and losses are 
represented in a single unitary system (Tom et al., 2007) or separately by two independent 
systems (Kahn et al., 2002; Knutson, Fong, et al., 2001; Yacubian et al., 2006). Some of the AIC 
neurons encoding a parametric value signal did continuously across gains and losses (14/47; 
30%). However, most AIC neurons encoded gain or loss-specific value signals (33/47; 70%). 
Thus, while there is some evidence for both hypotheses, most AIC value-encoding neurons form 
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two independent representations that encode gains or losses, respectively. This functional 
separation is further supported by the presence of a large number of neurons carrying a 
categorical gain/loss signal. Interestingly, the number of loss-encoding neurons (29/33; 88%) is 
much larger than the number of gain-encoding AIC neurons (4/33; 12%). This may explain why 
human imaging studies often find a link between the AIC and the anticipation of aversive 
outcomes (Canessa et al., 2013; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). Thus, the AIC recordings show the 
presence of separate neuronal populations that encode value as a relative gain or loss. This could 
be the neuronal underpinning of the separate utility functions used in prospect theory. 
4.3.3 Anterior insular cortex is engaged in monitoring ‘risk’ of option as well as ‘risk-
attitude’ of subject 
       ‘Risk’ is often formalized and quantified as the outcome variance, and the AIC has been 
implicated to play a role in monitoring risk(Bossaerts, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2008). In line with 
this, we found 8% of the AIC neurons (n=19/240) whose activity correlates with the outcome 
variance. Moreover, the trial-by-trial variability of the monkeys’ choice and risk attitude was 
correlated with activity changes in a subgroup of AIC neurons (Figure 6). All of this supports 
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Chapter 5 
Innovations and future directions 
      In the previous chapters, we described how contextual factors including current wealth level 
and gain/loss context influenced monkeys’ risky behaviors as postulated by prospect theory and 
how the core concepts assumed in prospect theory were represented in the primate brain. In this 
chapter, we will highlight the innovations and significance of these findings and discuss a few 
lines of continuing/future research that, with my thesis work as the foundation, could enrich our 
knowledge about the neuronal network underlying decision-making under risk.   
5.1 Innovations and significances of the current research   
5.1.1 A behavioral model to investigate contextual-dependent risk attitude   
      The development of the token-based gambling task creates a situation in which the monkeys’ 
risk attitude is not stable, but flexible and context-dependent. Specifically, both the token asset 
indicating the monkeys’ current wealth level and the outcomes being gains and losses influence 
monkeys’ preference toward risk. The use of tokens to this task allows investigating the monkeys’ 
attitudes toward “economic losses” (reduction of the secondary reward) rather than “aversive 
stimuli” like intense light/sound, air-puff, foot-shock, bitter taste/odor that are directly delivered 
to the animals (primary punishment). Furthermore, it allows us to explore other behavioral 
effects that modulation of risk preference and economic choices, such as the endowment and 
framing effect.       
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5.1.2 Supporting evidence of prospect theory in behavioral, modeling, and neural levels    
      Prospect theory provides profound insights into how humans make risky decisions in a wide 
range of circumstances (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, 1992). The behavioral hallmarks described 
by the theory have also been reported in old- and new-world monkeys, as well as in rats (M. K. 
Chen et al., 2006; Constantinople et al., 2019; Farashahi et al., 2018; Stauffer et al., 2015). This 
suggests that the neural circuits responsible for making risky decisions may have been 
evolutionarily conserved across mammals. Using a token-based gambling task, we demonstrated 
that monkeys exhibited different risk-attitudes when they were in different wealth levels and in 
different gain/loss contexts as described in the prospect theory. With a series of model 
examination, we further found the wealth-dependent prospect theory model well explained these 
behavioral effects. Finally, we found activity of AIC neurons in macaques exhibits critical 
characteristics including “reference-dependent” and “asymmetric value function in gain and loss” 
that are postulated by Prospect Theory. These behavioral, modeling, and neuronal findings 
provide further support that prospect theory is the result of neuronal circuits that are conserved in 
human and animals (at least in non-human primate).  
5.1.3 Role of the anterior insular cortex in decision making under risk   
      To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study recording single neurons of the AIC in 
awake, behaving primates during risky decision-making. We interpreted the function of AIC 
from the perspective of economic, risky decisions (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005) and within the 
framework of Prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). Decisions are likely not only 
guided by the rational, abstract processes depicted by economic models but are strongly 
influenced by emotional processes (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The AIC has been suggested to 
occupy a central position in regulating emotions as it receives interoceptive afferents from 
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visceral organs through the posterior granular insula area, representing contextual information 
(as demonstrated by this study), and is closely connected with the amygdala and autonomic 
nuclei  (Craig, 2002; Evrard, 2019). This study took the first step to delineate how the decision 
context modulates economic value representation and thereby impacts the decision of subjects. 
Future work will further investigate the interacting functions of AIC in economic decisions, 
emotions, and autonomic regulation. 
5.2 Future directions 
5.2.1 Behavioral analyses across trials 
      In the current study, we developed the token-based gambling task, in which the monkey had 
to acquire multiple tokens (≥6 tokens) in successive trials to receive an immediate reward. Thus, 
the choice of each trial naturally dependents on the choices in previous trials and their results. 
Nevertheless, in the behavioral and modeling analyses so far, we only focused on how variables 
in the current trial (e.g. token asset, the context of gain/loss, and values of presented options) 
influenced monkeys’ risky behavior. To better depict how monkeys made decisions in the token-
based gambling task across trials, our next steps will be to examining how monkeys behave 
based on past events (e.g. different history effects) and the prospect of future events.       
      We can first investigate the history effect on a smaller scale by examining how monkeys’ 
risky choices are influenced by the choice history or outcome history in the previous trial(s). We 
would like to test whether monkeys showed inclinations to switch or repeat their choices based 
on their choice in the previous trial and their outcome (choice history). One possibility is that 
monkeys use a ‘win-stay and loose-shift’ strategy (Blanchard et al., 2014; Constantinople et al., 
2019). In this strategy, the monkeys would repeat a choice (e.g., a gamble), when that same 
choice resulted in a win (i.e., the better outcome of the gamble), but would switch to choosing 
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the sure option when they had lost the gamble in the past trial. In that case, the outcome history 
would be evaluated in a binary matter. Another possibility is that the monkeys adapted their 
behavior based on the token outcome (token numbers -3 to 3) they received in the previous trial. 
In that case, the outcome history would be evaluated in a parametric manner. Finally, if monkeys’ 
behaviors are indeed biased by the choice and outcome history, we can ask how far back the 
effects be traced back and how the relative weight of their outcome on the present choice 
changes (Lau & Glimcher, 2005).    
      We can also investigate history effects on a larger time scale to see whether the monkeys’ 
behavior is influenced by the fatigue effect (Süss & Schmiedek, 2000) or the satiation effect 
(Yamada et al., 2013). For example, within a session, the monkeys might be more cautious to 
maximize the value of the chosen option in the early phase while starting to use some heuristics 
like a repeated gamble or sure choice in the late phase. We can further examine whether this 
switch from rational choice to heuristic is directly related to the passage of time or the monkeys’ 
satiation state indicated by the reward volume they have received. Furthermore, since monkeys 
can learn to collect enough tokens in a few trials to win an immediate reward, we might 
hypothesize that monkeys can represent the ‘prospect’ of future reward. In that case, we can 
examine whether the monkeys have the ability to plan actions across multiple trials to achieve 
future goals (collect at 6 tokens to exchange for a large amount of water). This is relevant to the 
reward proximity model described in chapter 4 that assumed monkeys were optimizing reward 
harvesting across trials.  
5.2.2 Risk-seeking monkeys 
      Overall, monkeys in the present study were more prone to choose gamble options (Figure. 
2.5). This is in line with similar findings of previous monkey experiments (Farashahi et al., 2018; 
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McCoy & Platt, 2005; So & Stuphorn, 2010; Stauffer et al., 2015), yet is inconsistent with most 
human studies (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1979, 1992). It is unclear whether such a discrepancy between humans and monkeys 
was due to species-specific differences, individual variability, or task design. Macaques have 
been shown to be risk-aversive, like humans, in a foraging task (Eisenreich et al., 2019) and in a 
risky decision-making task using animals’ hydration state to index their non-monetary wealth 
level (Yamada et al., 2013). The observed tendency to choose gamble options was therefore 
likely due to task-specific factors, such as the small reward amount at stake and a large number 
of trials. Further studies that examine whether and how these potential factors can influence 
monkeys’ risk attitude or perform an analog experiment in humans may provide a better 
understanding of this behavioral discrepancy.  
5.2.3 Neuronal response after the choice 
      In the neural results showed in chapter 4, we focused on activities of AIC neurons specific 
during the choice period (from target onset to saccade initiation). This helped us to investigate 
how AIC neurons encoded decision-related variables that would finally guide monkeys’ choices. 
However, it is of critical importance to know whether and how AIC neurons play a role in 
representing the reward expectation (Kaskan et al., 2017; Mizuhiki et al., 2012), actual reward 
(Wittmann et al., 2010), and risk or reward prediction error (RPE) (Preuschoff et al., 2008; 
Seymour et al., 2004).  
      We would like to first focus on neuronal activity during the period between choice onset to 
token outcome revealed, to examine whether the outcome expectation (estimated as the expected 
value of the chosen option) is represented by AIC neurons. After the token outcome revealed, we 
can further check whether the AIC neurons carry the information of (1) parametric token 
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outcome (numerical token outcome from -3 to 3), (2) categorical outcome (winning or losing the 
gamble, or receiving a certain outcome from the sure option), (3) reward prediction error (the 
discrepancy between outcome expectation and actual outcome), and (4) context-dependent token 
outcome (whether two identical token outcomes that gaining/losing ‘zero token’ resulted in a 
gain or loss trials are encoded differently), which is consistent to the reward prediction error 
framework that reflects the value of an outcome relative to its reward expectation.  
      We can thereafter extend the neuronal activities in the outcome period to discuss the issues 
(1) whether outcome values in loss or gain context were encoded differentially within the AIC, 
(2) whether both negative and positive prediction error signals can be found in the AIC and (3) 
what is the relationship between neuronal coding of negative/positive value and neuronal coding 
of negative/positive RPE.  
      To explore more on how these value signals and learning signals are represented or 
implemented in the brain, it is of critical importance to investigate brain areas that are known to 
highly engage in value-based decision making and reinforcement learning (Niv, 2009). Brain 
areas in the dopaminergic system, including the prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and the ventral 
tegmental area may be good candidates for future research (Glimcher, 2011; Schultz, 2015). 
Moreover, it is also interesting to take brain areas that are suggested to represent the negative 
reward-prediction error in either the dopaminergic system (e.g. habenula) (Matsumoto & 
Hikosaka, 2007; Salas et al., 2010) or serotoninergic system (Daw et al., 2002) into to future 
consideration.  
5.2.4 Dynamic neuronal activity and population analyses 
      In the neural results showed in chapter 4, we found AIC neurons showed mix-selectivity to 
multiple variables in the choice period. It is plausible that AIC neurons can encode many task-
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related signals in different dimensions. Furthermore, if we expanded the time scale to the whole 
trial, we can find more complicated dynamic multiplexed signals in the AIC neurons. For 
example, a neuron can carry the information of token asset in the ITI (before the token cue onset), 
sustained the information of token asset after token cue onset, encode the expected value of 
gamble option, and then encode the reward expectation after choice.  
      Besides the AIC, accumulating evidence has found that multiple brain areas including the 
prefrontal cortex (Aoi et al., 2020; Rigotti et al., 2013), orbitofrontal cortex (Abe & Lee, 2011; 
Hirokawa et al., 2019), and amygdala (Corder et al., 2019) have a multidimensional code for 
context, decisions, and both relevant and irrelevant sensory or motor information. Moreover, 
these representations can also evolve in time. The heterogeneous tunings to multiple variables in 
a single neuron level make it difficult to know the clear role of these neuronal representations. It 
thereafter led to the suggestion that representation in individual neurons in these higher cognitive 
brain areas are randomly mixed and can only be well understood at the neural population level. 
By combining multi-electrode recording with population analyses (e.g. clustering analyses and 
dimensionality reduction), we may gain more insight into how AIC neurons represent 
information (e.g. the state of current wealth or the task-relevant sensory information) 
dynamically  in a multi-dimensional subspace in the future.     
5.2.5 Role of frontal areas in this decision-making process   
      In the present study, we found that neurons in the anterior insular cortex (AIC) monitor the 
contextual factors that influence monkey’s risk attitudes. Specifically, AIC neurons encode the 
wealth level of the monkey and option values in a gain/loss-specific manner, suggesting a 
potential neural basis for the reference point and the asymmetrical value functions proposed in 
prospect theory. These results support the hypothesis that the role of primate AIC in risky 
 - 118 -  
 
decision-making is to provide the information of decision context, and by which the value 
representation of available options is modulated in support of the animal’s choices. However, we 
only found changes in the activity of a minor group of AIC neurons directly predict inter-trial 
fluctuations in risky choice. It suggested the AIC neurons likely do not control risky choice 
directly, but rather modify ongoing choice processes in the frontal cortex by providing contextual 
input.  
      We are particularly interested in two frontal areas, the lateral prefrontal cortex (Paulus et al., 
2001) and medial frontal cortex (Critchley et al., 2001; Ernst et al., 2004; Gehring & Willoughby, 
2002) since their activity levels have been found to correlate with the probability that a subject 
chooses to seek or avoid risk. The first candidate, the supplementary eye field (SEF) is an 
oculomotor area in the medial frontal cortex that was found to represent action value signals in 
an oculomotor gambling task (So & Stuphorn, 2010; Stuphorn et al., 2010; Stuphorn & Schall, 
2006). The second candidate, the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) is known to be active during 
risky decisions (Paulus et al., 2001) and connect the AIC and SEF by receiving input from AIC 
and projecting to SEF. Thus, we hypothesize that (1) AIC neurons represent behaviorally 
relevant contextual information that influences the probability of choosing a particular risky 
reward option, (2) SEF neurons receives information about risk-attitude and uses it to influence 
decisions under risk, and (3) LPFC transforms risk-attitude signals in AIC into choice selection 
signals in SEF.   
5.2.6 Causal role of these brain areas in the decision making under risk  
      In addition to recording the neuronal activity in the proposed brain areas (AIC, FEF, and 
LPFC) to search for the neuronal correlates of contextual variables that influence risk attitude or 
reflect the risky choice, we can further test whether these areas are causally necessary for 
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decision making under risk by reversible inactivation techniques. At the behavioral level, we can 
examine how monkeys’ risk attitudes in token-based gambling are affected after the inactivation 
of one of these areas. At the neuronal level, we can also monitor how the inactivation of one area 
affects the neural activity recorded simultaneously in other non-inactivated areas.  
      These experiments will provide novel approaches to understanding the competition between 
risk-seeking and risk-avoidance behavior at the neuronal level, and gain more understanding of 
the neural mechanisms controlling risk attitude.   
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